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No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Lack of 
Protection for Volunteers Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Statutes1 
Lawrence D. Rosenthal2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One issue that often arises in cases involving Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) is whether a particular individual is an “employee.”3 There 
are many reasons why this issue is important. First, only employees 
can sue under these statutes.4 Second, an entity might not be 
covered by these statutes if it does not have the statutorily required 
 
 1.  This Article will not focus on the employment status of volunteer student interns. 
For articles regarding that topic, see Craig Durrant, Comment, To Benefit or Not To Benefit: 
Mutually Induced Consideration as a Test for the Legality of Unpaid Internships, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 169 (2013); Anthony J. Tucci, Note, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL 
Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1363 (2012); David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 215 (2002); and Craig J. Ortner, Note, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment 
Realities: The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613 (1998). 
 2.   Lawrence D. Rosenthal is the Associate Dean for Academics and a Professor of 
Legal Writing at Northern Kentucky University – Salmon P. Chase College of Law. He earned 
his J.D. from the Vanderbilt University Law School, and he received his LL.M. from the 
Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank Mike Mannheimer for his 
thoughtful comments on this Article, and he would also like to thank Bradley Steffen for his 
research assistance with this Article. 
 3.  The definitions of “employee” are found in the following sections of the United 
States Code: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) (ADA); 
and 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2012) (ADEA). Throughout this Article, I will spend most of my 
time referencing Title VII; however, the statements I make about Title VII also apply to the 
ADA and the ADEA unless otherwise noted. 
 4.  See infra cases discussed in Part IV. As will be addressed later, Title VII prohibits 
employers from discriminating against “individuals,” not “employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (2012). Nevertheless, despite an early opinion that did not restrict the term 
“individuals” to “employees,” Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), courts now restrict lawsuits to “employees” (and job applicants and former employees), 
Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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minimum number of employees.5 Finally, the number of employees 
determines the damage caps under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.6 As a 
result, in an effort to minimize liability under these federal statutes 
(and in an effort to save on labor costs), some entities limit the 
number of individuals they “employ” and rely on volunteers and/or 
independent contractors.7 
This Article will focus on the fact that volunteers cannot sue 
under federal anti-discrimination statutes and do not count as 
employees when determining whether an entity has the statutorily 
required minimum number of employees to be covered under these 
statutes. Unfortunately for volunteers, the federal anti-discrimination 
statutes’ language and legislative history,8 the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) interpretation of these statutes,9 
and case law10 are fairly clear that volunteers cannot sue the entities 
to which they devote their time.11 Although some courts have 
allowed certain “volunteers” to bring discrimination claims, they 
have not truly conferred the right to sue upon volunteers as a class; 
rather, these courts decided only that the plaintiffs were not 
volunteers at all but employees and could therefore pursue their 
 
 5.  For example, both Title VII and the ADA do not apply to entities with fewer 
than fifteen “employees.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2012). 
The ADEA does not apply to entities with fewer than twenty “employees.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 630(b) (2012). 
 6.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012) (establishing limits on compensatory and punitive 
damages under Title VII and the ADA). 
 7.  The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of who is an employee under various 
federal statutes; however, in those cases, the issue did not involve the distinction between 
employees and volunteers, but the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 
(2003) (applying a multi-factor, common-law agency test focusing on control when deciding 
whether physician-shareholders in a medical practice group were “employees” under the 
ADA); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1991) (applying a multi-
factor, common-law agency test for determining who qualifies as an “employee” under 
ERISA); and Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) 
(applying a common-law agency test focusing on control to determine whether an individual 
was an “employee” under the Copyright Act). 
 8.  See infra Section III.A. 
 9.  See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (U.S. 2000). 
 10.  See infra Part IV. 
 11.  These volunteers might, however, be able to bring tort or contract claims against 
their “employers” if the facts of those cases give rise to either of those types of causes of action. 
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claims.12 Thus, for volunteers to gain the protections of federal anti-
discrimination statutes, they must prove that they are actually 
employees inaccurately labeled as “volunteers.”13 
Interestingly, a split of authority has developed regarding how 
someone qualifies as an employee. Some courts first analyze the 
benefits an individual receives and require a showing that those 
benefits constitute sufficient remuneration.14 If there is sufficient 
remuneration, courts then use a common-law agency test to 
evaluate the relationship.15 Other courts do not look at 
remuneration as a threshold inquiry, but rather consider it as one 
factor in evaluating the relationship.16 Regardless of which test is 
used, if the court determines the plaintiff is a volunteer, he will 
have no remedy under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Despite 
the time these individuals devote to various types of entities, and 
despite the risks some of these individuals take (especially volunteer 
firemen), courts have routinely rejected their requests for 
protection from discrimination.17 
This Article will first address the statutory provisions that have led 
courts to leave volunteers unprotected.18 Next, the Article will explore 
the statutes’ legislative history and the EEOC’s position regarding this 
issue.19 The Article will then address the circuit split regarding how 
 
 12.  See infra Part IV. In some situations, the issue was not whether the plaintiff was an 
employee who could sue; rather, the court had to determine whether other individuals in the 
“workplace” were employees who would count toward the statutorily-required minimum 
number of employees for an entity to be subject to federal anti-discrimination statutes. See 
infra Part IV. 
 13.  Because entities must have a minimum number of employees to be covered under 
federal anti-discrimination statutes, plaintiffs must also occasionally prove that their “co-
workers” are “employees.” See supra notes 5, 12. 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  See infra Part IV. Although this test evaluates many factors, it focuses mostly on the 
amount of control the “employer” exerts over the “employee.” See Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003) (applying a multi-factor, 
common-law agency test focusing on control when deciding whether physician-shareholders in 
a medical practice group were “employees” under the ADA). 
 16.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 17.  See infra Part IV. 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  See infra Part III. As will be addressed later, the EEOC’s position regarding the 
issue of how to determine an individual’s employment status is not entirely clear. I do, 
however, try to clarify this issue later in the Article. See infra notes 36, 66. 
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courts determine employment status.20 Finally, the Article will provide 
reasons how and why Congress, the courts, and the EEOC should 
expand protection to volunteers.21 If these statutes’ protections are 
expanded, more people will likely continue to volunteer their time and 
there will be more pleasant work environments; Congress, the courts, 
and the EEOC will send a message that no discrimination will be 
tolerated, regardless of the victim; and victims of discrimination will 
have a remedy, even if they are not true employees. In order to further 
these worthy goals, Congress, the courts, and the EEOC should do 
what they can to ensure that federal anti-discrimination statutes 
protect volunteers. 
II. THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are several provisions of Title VII relevant to the issue of 
who may sue and whom those individuals can sue; these provisions 
are: (1) the substantive prohibition against discrimination,22 (2) the 
definition of “employer,”23 and (3) the definition of “employee.”24 
First, Title VII’s substantive prohibition against discrimination 
provides the following, in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.25 
 
 20.  See infra Part IV. 
 21.  See infra Part V. The language Congress used to explain the EEOC’s power to 
issue regulations is different under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. See Melissa Hart, 
Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1941 
(2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (ADEA); 
42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2012) (ADA)). 
 22.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 23.  § 2000e(b). 
 24.  § 2000e(f). The ADA and the ADEA have similar provisions regarding the 
prohibition against discrimination, and they also have similar definitions of “employee” and 
“employer.” See infra note 25. 
 25.  § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). This provision from Title VII focuses on 
intentional discrimination (disparate treatment). Subsection (2) (not provided) addresses 
employer policies that tend to limit or segregate employment opportunities based on protected 
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The substance of Title VII’s other relevant provisions is the 
following: (1) “[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for 
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person . . . [,]”26 and (2) “[t]he term ‘employee’ means an individual 
employed by an employer . . . .”27 Although Title VII’s substantive 
prohibition against discrimination addresses discrimination against 
“individuals,”28 courts have held that “individuals” means only 
employees (and job applicants, and former employees), and that it 
does not cover volunteers.29 One reason for this interpretation is that 
the statute prohibits “employers” from engaging in discriminatory 
actions, suggesting that only employees are protected.30 Also, the 
statute refers to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
 
characteristics (disparate impact). § 2000e-2(a)(2). In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress 
added a separate statutory provision to address claims of disparate impact. See § 2000e-2(k). 
The ADA’s relevant prohibitions and definitions can be found at § 12112 (providing a 
substantive prohibition against discrimination), § 12111(5) (defining “employer”), and § 
12111(4) (defining “employee”). 
The ADEA’s relevant prohibitions and definitions can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) 
(providing a substantive prohibition against discrimination), § 630(b) (defining “employer”), 
and § 630(f) (defining “employee”). All three statutes (Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA) 
have very similar definitions of the terms “employer” and “employee.” 
 26.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
 27.  § 2000e(f). As will be referenced several times in this Article, many courts have 
commented that Title VII’s definition of “employee” is vague and of little value. See infra Part IV. 
 28.  § 2000e-2(a). See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 
1242–43 (11th Cir. 1998), where the court noted that Title VII prohibits discrimination 
against “individuals,” but that just about all courts have limited Title VII protections to 
employees, former employees, and job applicants. The court relied on the following cases 
for this proposition: McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. 
Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1996); and Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 
F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., v. Wells, 
538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
 29.  See supra note 28. 
 30. § 2000e-2(a). See also Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243 (observing that Congress 
intended to limit Title VII to employment relationships); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 
996, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Title VII is an employment 
law, available only to employees . . . seeking redress for the unlawful employment practices of 
their employers.”). But see Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (deciding that Title VII reaches beyond “employees” and allows other “individuals” to 
pursue discrimination claims). 
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employment,”31 supporting the position that Title VII protects only 
employees (and job applicants and former employees).32 
The ADEA and the ADA have similar provisions, and these 
statutes have also been interpreted as not applying to volunteers.33 As 
a result, a plaintiff must satisfy the definition of “employee” and 
must also prove that the defendant has the requisite number of 
employees to be an “employer.” Although the first place courts look 
when determining an individual’s employment status is the just-
discussed statutory language which restricts claims to employees, 
some courts also look to legislative history and the EEOC’s 
interpretation of these statutes for guidance. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION’S POSITION 
Two places courts sometimes look when interpreting these 
statutes are the statutes’ legislative history and the EEOC’s position 
on this issue.34 The most relevant parts of the statutes’ legislative 
history involve (1) how Congress wanted the term “employee” 
interpreted, and (2) the purpose behind these statutes. The EEOC 
has addressed the volunteer issue in its Compliance Manual in two 
ways.35 First, the agency has stated that the determination of 
employment status should be made by looking at a variety of factors, 
 
 31.  § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 32.  Based on the language Congress used, courts could apply a very expansive 
interpretation and determine that all individuals (including volunteers) can pursue these claims; 
however, even if a volunteer can sue, that person must demonstrate that the defendant employs at 
least fifteen employees, and is therefore an “employer” subject to Title VII. See § 2000e(b) 
(defining employer); § 2000e-2(a) (providing examples of unlawful employer practices). 
 33.  See supra note 25 for citations to the relevant definitions and substantive 
prohibitions from the ADEA and the ADA. See also Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 
1158–60 (9th Cir. 2008), where the plaintiff brought claims pursuant to both the ADEA and 
the ADA, and the court engaged in a similar analysis for both claims. 
 34.  Although there is not much legislative history regarding whether federal anti-
discrimination statutes protect volunteers, the legislative history does address how courts 
should interpret the terms “employee” and “employer.” See, e.g., Graves v. Women’s Prof’l 
Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that Congress wanted the regular 
“dictionary definition[s]” to be used when interpreting these terms); see also infra this Part. 
 35.  See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1) (U.S. 2000). As noted earlier, Congress 
used different language when granting rule-making authority to the EEOC under Title VII, 
the ADA, and the ADEA. See supra note 21. 
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with no one factor being dispositive.36 Second, the agency has made 
clear that it believes that volunteers cannot sue under federal anti-
discrimination statutes; however, it has created some exceptions to 
this general rule.37 The EEOC’s positions on this issue will be 
addressed after the discussion of the statutes’ legislative history. 
A. The Legislative History 
Although the statutes’ legislative history does not directly address 
volunteers and whether they can sue, some courts have relied on the 
statutes’ legislative history when deciding this issue or determining 
whether the defendant is subject to the statutes’ prohibitions.38 Most 
courts that look at legislative history rely on the history that instructs 
courts to look at the dictionary definition of “employee” when 
 
 36.  See § 2-III(A)(1). Specifically, the Manual provides the following: “The question of 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists is fact-specific and depends on whether the 
employer controls the means and manner of the worker’s work performance. This 
determination requires consideration of all aspects of the worker’s relationship with the 
employer.” Id. These factors include: (1) “[t]he employer has the right to control when, where, 
and how the worker performs the job”; (2) “[t]he work does not require a high level of skill or 
expertise”; (3) “[t]he employer furnishes the tools, materials, and equipment”; (4) “[t]he work is 
performed on the employer’s premises”; (5) “[t]here is a continuing relationship between the 
worker and the employer” (6) “[t]he employer has the right to assign additional projects to the 
worker”; (6) “[t]he employer sets the hours of work and the duration of the job”; (7) “[t]he 
worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than the agreed cost of performing a particular 
job”; (8) “[t]he worker does not hire and pay assistants”; (9) “[t]he work performed by the 
worker is part of the regular business of the employer”; (10) “[t]he employer is in business”; (11) 
“[t]he worker is not engaged in his/her own distinct occupation or business”; (12) “[t]he 
employer provides the worker with benefits such as insurance, leave, or workers’ compensation”; 
(13) “[t]he worker is considered an employee of the employer for tax purposes (i.e., the employer 
withholds federal, state, and Social Security taxes)”; (14) “[t]he employer can discharge the 
worker”; and (15) “[t]he worker and the employer believe that they are creating an employer-
employee relationship.” Id. 
 37.  See § 2-III(A)(1)(c). These exceptions will be addressed in Section III.B of the 
Article. As will be discussed, the EEOC’s positions could appear to be inconsistent. On one 
hand, the EEOC indicates that the determination of employment status evaluates several 
factors, with no one factor being dispositive. On the other hand, the EEOC seems to 
acknowledge the validity of the threshold remuneration test when it takes the position that 
some “volunteers” can be considered employees if they receive sufficient compensation for 
their services. The inconsistency might, however, be explained away by interpreting the 
EEOC’s position as being that if an individual can satisfy the threshold remuneration test, he 
can then proceed to the next step of trying to satisfy the EEOC’s multi-factor test. 
 38.  See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 
1998); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Graves, 907 F.2d at 73. 
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deciding employment status;39 however, some courts dig a bit deeper 
to try to find the specific meaning of the relevant terms.40 
One court that addressed this issue is the Eleventh Circuit.41 One 
of the issues involved in Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., was 
whether non-employees could sue under Title VII.42 The court (1) 
looked at Congressional intent and Title VII’s legislative history,43 
(2) noted that, in enacting Title VII, Congress did not “presume to 
obliterate all manner of inequality,”44 and (3) stated what it believed 
was the answer to this question.45 
The court then looked at Title VII’s 1972 Amendments, which 
extended Title VII’s coverage to federal employment.46 The court 
noted that the amendments covered “all personnel actions affecting 
employees or applicants for employment . . . [,]” and that the 
amendments would make sense only if the original statute applied 
only to employees.47 The court concluded that “the amendment[s] 
support[] the interpretation of ‘any individual’ . . . as limited to 
those individuals who are employees.”48 
Another court to address Title VII’s legislative history was the 
Eighth Circuit.49 In Graves v. Women’s Professional Rodeo Ass’n, the 
court used the ordinary, dictionary definitions of “employee,” 
“employer,” and “employ.”50 It did so because of Title VII’s 
 
 39.  See supra note 34. 
 40.  See Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 1241–45. 
 43.  Id. at 1243. 
 44.  Id. (quoting Keyes v. Sec’y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 45.  Id. (“Congress intended to limit the scope of the Act to specific employment 
relationships; thus, the statute provides relief only against ‘employers’ as defined under the 
statute. We can assume that Congress also meant to limit the pool of potential plaintiffs under 
Title VII; otherwise, any person could sue an ‘employer’ under the statute regardless of 
whether she actually had an employment relationship with that employer. Hence, courts have 
almost universally held that the scope of the term ‘any individual’ is limited to employees.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 
717, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1994))). 
 48.  Id. Although the court in Llampallas certainly addressed the meaning of the term 
“employee,” it focused more of its attention on the definition of “individual.” Id. at 1242–43. 
 49.  Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 50.  Id. at 72–73. 
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legislative history, which “explicitly provides that the dictionary 
definition should govern the interpretation of ‘employer’ under Title 
VII.”51 After citing from Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, the court concluded: 
Central to the meaning of these words is the idea of 
compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone 
who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other 
compensation to the person who provides services—that person 
being the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to 
the putative employee in exchange for his services is not a 
sufficient condition, but it is an essential condition to the 
existence of an employer-employee relationship.52 
As will be addressed later, Graves adopted the position the 
majority of courts use when distinguishing between employees and 
volunteers, requiring a threshold showing of sufficient remuneration 
before more details of the relationship can be evaluated.53 
Another statement regarding Title VII’s legislative history comes 
from two district courts—the Eastern District of Pennsylvania54 and 
the Middle District of North Carolina.55 Specifically, the court in 
Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television relied on McBroom v. Western Electric 
Co. for the following proposition: “‘In enacting Title VII, Congress 
sought to eliminate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or 
limiting one’s livelihood simply because of one’s race, color, sex, 
religion or national origin.’ . . . Unpaid volunteers are not susceptible 
to the discriminatory practices which the Act was designed to 
 
 51.  Id. at 73 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (subcommittee response to Sen. 
Dirksen’s memorandum)). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 73–74. As will be addressed later, the Fourth Circuit cited to the Eighth 
Circuit’s use of Title VII’s legislative history. See Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 
F.3d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit also cited Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 
657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987), for the following two propositions: (1) “[i]n enacting Title 
VII, Congress sought to eliminate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or limiting 
one’s livelihood simply because of one’s race, color, sex, religion or national origin”; and (2) 
“[u]npaid volunteers are not susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the Act was 
designed to eliminate.” Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221 (quoting Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795). 
 54.  Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 794. 
 55.  McBroom, 429 F. Supp. at 909. 
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eliminate.”56 This statement reflects currently prevailing judicial 
views toward the interpretation of Title VII and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes with respect to protecting volunteers.57 
Thus, there is support for the position that Title VII applies only 
to employees (and job applicants and former employees).58 First, 
congressional intent suggests that the term “employee” should be 
given its ordinary dictionary definition, and that dictionary definition 
would not include volunteers.59 Second, the 1972 amendments 
arguably support the proposition that volunteers are not covered.60 
And finally case law interpreting the history behind anti-
discrimination statutes suggests that Title VII was intended to 
protect against discrimination in employment opportunities, and that 
volunteers do not fall within the class Congress intended to protect 
when it passed Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination 
statutes.61 As a result, volunteers must look elsewhere for protection 
against discrimination in the “workplace.” 
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Position 
Although the EEOC has not published a regulation regarding 
this issue, it has addressed the issue in its Compliance Manual.62 The 
 
 56.  Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795 (quoting McBroom, 429 F. Supp. at 911) 
(emphasis added). 
 57.  See also Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 786, at *10 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005) (“[T]he purpose of Title VII ‘is plain from the 
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group.’” (quoting Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (emphasis added)). 
 58.  As noted earlier, courts have interpreted the ADA and the ADEA in a similar 
manner. See supra notes 24, 25. 
 59.  See 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (response of the subcommittee to Sen. Dirksen’s 
memorandum). Also, as was addressed in Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 
1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998), the term “individual” is limited to employees, job applicants, 
and former employees. 
 60.  See Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1242–44 (addressing Title VII and the 1972 
amendments to the statute). 
 61.  See Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795 (quoting McBroom, 429 F. Supp. at 911). See also 
Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 
1990) (“Title VII is an employment law, available only to employees . . . seeking redress for the 
unlawful employment practices of their employers.”) 
 62.  See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (U.S. 2000). One possible reason the 
EEOC has not issued a regulation regarding this issue is that its power to do so is unclear, as 
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Manual is clear that volunteers cannot sue under federal anti-
discrimination statutes.63 The Manual does, however, provide 
two exceptions: 
Volunteers usually are not protected “employees.” However, an 
individual may be considered an employee of a particular entity if, 
as a result of volunteer service, s/he receives benefits such as a 
pension, group life insurance, workers’ compensation, and access to 
professional certification, even if the benefits are provided by a 
third party. The benefits constitute “significant remuneration” 
rather than merely the “inconsequential incidents of an otherwise 
gratuitous relationship.”64 
. . . 
A volunteer may also be covered by the EEO statutes if the 
volunteer work is required for regular employment or regularly 
leads to regular employment with the same entity. In such 
situations, discrimination by the respondent operates to deny the 
charging party an employment opportunity.65 
Therefore, although the EEOC believes that volunteers are not 
protected, volunteers might be able to gain protection if they receive 
sufficient benefits or if their volunteer positions can lead to “regular 
employment” with the same entity.66 Thus, while the EEOC believes 
that volunteers are not protected in most cases, it does provide for 
some situations in which they could pursue their claims.67 
 
Congress used different language when giving the agency the authority to promulgate 
regulations under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. See supra note 21. 
 63.  EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (U.S. 2000). 
 64.  Id. The EEOC Compliance Manual cited Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the 
Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999), and Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of 
Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993) for these propositions. 
 65.  Id. The case upon which the EEOC relied for this proposition was Charlton v. 
Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 66.  See infra Part IV. 
 67.  Of course, if the “volunteer” received these significant benefits, that person would 
most likely no longer be considered a “volunteer”; rather, he or she would be considered an 
employee. In Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
171623, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012), the Northern District of Illinois cited the Manual 
when determining whether an individual was an employee. The EEOC suggests using a list of 
factors when deciding who qualifies as an employee, but it also provides in its Compliance 
Manual that individuals can be considered employees if they receive sufficient benefits. See 
supra notes 36, 37. See also infra Part IV. As noted previously, these two positions taken by the 
EEOC could appear to be inconsistent. On one hand, the EEOC indicates that the 
determination of employment status evaluates several factors, with no one factor being 
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Although the EEOC usually takes pro-plaintiff positions, it does 
not take a pro-plaintiff approach on the issue of whether volunteers 
can pursue claims under federal anti-discrimination statutes.68 
Nonetheless, by providing some exceptions to this general rule, the 
EEOC is giving hope to some individuals who dedicate time and 
effort to benefit a particular organization.69 Although not many courts 
have relied specifically on the EEOC’s Compliance Manual when 
addressing this issue, the Fifth Circuit cited to the Manual in support 
of its position that while volunteers are generally not protected, in 
some circumstances certain “volunteers” can pursue their claims.70 
That opinion, along with other opinions that relied on the EEOC’s 
position, will be addressed in the next Part of this Article.71 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING HOW TO DETERMINE 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
Although courts agree that volunteers are not covered under 
federal anti-discrimination statutes, the courts are split regarding 
 
dispositive. On the other hand, the EEOC seems to acknowledge the validity of the threshold 
remuneration test when it provides the first exception listed above. The inconsistency might, 
however, be explained by interpreting the EEOC’s position as being that if an individual can 
fall in to the exception regarding remuneration, he or she can then proceed to the next step of 
trying to satisfy the EEOC’s multi-factor test. 
 68.  As will be addressed later, one interpretation of the EEOC Compliance Manual is 
that it does take a more pro-plaintiff approach by endorsing the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test rather than the threshold remuneration test. But see supra notes 37, 67. 
 69.  Specifically, according to the EEOC, an individual can lose his “volunteer” status 
and become an employee if he receives sufficient benefits and/or if his volunteer activities can 
create a pathway to full-time employment. See § 2-III(A)(1)(c). 
 70.  See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
In addition to the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also looked at the EEOC’s position on this 
issue. See Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2011), 
where the court noted the EEOC’s position that volunteers are typically not employees, but 
can be considered employees if they receive sufficient benefits. In Bryson, the EEOC had 
determined that the individuals in question were employees because their employer 
“exercise[d] sufficient control over the actions of the [m]embers” and because the members 
received compensation despite not being on the defendant’s payroll. Id. In a different case, the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts also relied on the EEOC 
Compliance Manual when it evaluated the status of several individuals the plaintiff claimed 
were “employees” under the ADA. See Mahoney v. Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010). 
 71.  See supra note 36 for the list of factors the EEOC considers when determining 
employment status. 
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how to determine whether someone is a volunteer or an employee.72 
Most courts first evaluate whether the individual receives sufficient 
remuneration prior to possibly being considered an employee.73 If the 
individual receives sufficient remuneration, the courts then use 
common-law agency principles to determine the nature of the 
relationship; this multi-factor, common-law agency test focuses on 
the control the “employer” can exercise over the “employee.”74 
Some circuits, however, take a different approach and look at 
remuneration as only one factor used to determine employment 
status.75 Irrespective of which test the courts use, the analysis of 
employment status does not address whether volunteers can sue; it 
answers only whether the individuals are, in fact, volunteers. By 
answering only that question, the courts fail to address the more 
important issue of whether volunteers should be protected from 
discrimination in the workplace. 
 
 72.  See supra Part I. 
 73.  The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the majority 
approach and require a finding of sufficient remuneration before evaluating the other aspects of 
the relationship. See infra this Part. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has not yet directly addressed this issue, but that court did apply a similar two-
part inquiry in determining whether auxiliary choristers were employees under the National 
Labor Relations Act. See Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 761–63 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 74.  Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 356–59 (6th Cir. 
2011) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to looking at the 
“control” issue, some courts look at the “economic realities” of the situation to see if the 
“employee” is truly dependent on the “employer.” See Dorr v. Ford Motor Co., No. 10-CV-
13822, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133827, at *12–13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2011), adopted by, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133776 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2011). 
 75.  The Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit follow this approach. See infra Section 
IV.B. Also, at least one district court from within the First Circuit has relatively recently 
utilized the totality-of-the-circumstances test when deciding the employment status of several 
individuals. See Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224 at *17–20 (relying on Lopez v. 
Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2009)). In that opinion, the court noted that lack 
of remuneration was not dispositive. See Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24. 
A district court from within the Seventh Circuit also followed this approach, creating a split 
within the Seventh Circuit. See Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 171623 at *22–28 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012). 
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A. The Majority Approach 
In determining employment status, most courts require a two-
part inquiry. The first part evaluates the individual’s remuneration.76 
If there is no remuneration, or if the remuneration is negligible, that 
individual will not be considered an employee.77 If, however, there is 
more than de minimis remuneration, the court will then look at 
common-law agency principles and evaluate factors related to those 
principles to determine the nature of the relationship.78 This 
approach is followed by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits.79 
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Pietras v. Bd. of Fire 
Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist., where the plaintiff, a 
volunteer probationary firefighter, alleged a Title VII violation.80 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Bryson, 656 F.2d at 356 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Although I am using the term “plaintiff” here, this analysis also applies in situations 
where it is clear that the plaintiff is an employee, but the court has to determine whether the 
defendant meets the fifteen-employee threshold to be an “employer” under Title VII. Some of 
the cases described in this Section address whether the plaintiff was an employee; some address 
whether the other people “working” for the defendant were employees; and some cases 
address both issues. Nonetheless, courts use the same analysis regardless of whether they are 
trying to determine the employment status of a plaintiff or the employment status of 
individuals who might or might not count toward the threshold needed for coverage under 
federal anti-discrimination statutes. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See cases cited infra this Section. The First, Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have 
not squarely addressed this issue; however, as will be discussed in this Section, district courts 
from within these jurisdictions have issued opinions regarding this issue. See infra this Section. 
 80.  180 F.3d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1999). In addition to Pietras, the following cases from 
the Second Circuit and from district courts within the Second Circuit also support the 
proposition that the first question to evaluate when determining employment status is whether 
the individual receives adequate remuneration for the work he performs. Gulino v. N.Y. State 
Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that courts should look to the 
“common-law principles” only in situations that “plausibly approximate an employment 
relationship,” and that there must be some direct or indirect remuneration from the employer. 
If no remuneration exists, there is no employment relationship); Knight v. State Univ. of N.Y. 
at Stony Brook, No. 13-CV-0481(JS)(GRB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161185, at *7–8 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2013) (noting that when determining the nature of the relationship, the 
first question to ask is whether the plaintiff has received any type of remuneration from the 
defendant); Pastor v. P’ship for Children’s Rights, No. 10-CV-5167(CBA)(LB), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 140917, at *3–7 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, 538 F. App’x 119 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“Volunteers and interns constitute employees under Title VII and the ADA only if they 
receive some kind of direct or indirect financial benefit or promise thereof from an 
employer.”); Carcasole-Lacal v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-CV-4359(DGT), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
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One issue the court addressed was whether the plaintiff was an 
employee.81 Recognizing that Title VII’s definitions of “employee” 
and “employer” were not helpful, the court stated that when 
Congress used the word “employee,” it intended “the conventional 
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency 
doctrine.”82 The court then observed that this question “usually 
turns on whether [the individual] has received ‘direct or indirect 
remuneration’ from the alleged employer.”83 Rejecting the argument 
that an employee must receive a salary, the court noted that receipt 
of other types of benefits could result in an employment 
relationship.84 The court stated: “[I]t is clear that an employment 
relationship within the scope of Title VII can exist even when the 
putative employee receives no salary so long as he or she gets 
numerous job-related benefits.”85 Here, the plaintiff received a 
retirement pension, life and disability insurance, death benefits, and 
some medical benefits.86 The court concluded that because of these 
benefits, the district court was not clearly erroneous in deciding that 
the plaintiff was an employee.87 Thus, although the defendant 
thought it used volunteers, the court concluded that some of those 
individuals could be considered employees;88 the court did not, 
 
LEXIS 11507, at *19–20 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2003), aff’d, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13619 (2d 
Cir. July 7, 2005) (noting that under the ADEA, an employee must be the recipient of “some 
type of job-related benefits” and meet the common-law agency test); Tyszka v. Edward 
McMahon Agency, 188 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting that a plaintiff must 
receive direct or indirect benefits to be considered an employee); Keller v. Niskayuna Consol. 
Fire Dist. 1, 51 F. Supp. 2d 223, 231–32 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that there is no 
employment relationship without any “hire[],” which would entail guaranteed benefits in 
exchange for services provided). 
 81.  Pietras, 180 F.3d at 472–73. 
 82.  Id. at 473 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,    
322–23 (1992)). 
 83.  Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 471 
 87.  Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
 88.  Id. Following the majority rule, the court should have next applied common-law 
agency principles to analyze the relationship. See United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 
83, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that to prove “employee” status, one must show that he was 
hired by the putative employer and then prevail under the multi-factor, common-law agency 
test). See also EEOC v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 535 F. Supp. 2d 323, 328–29 (E.D.N.Y. 
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however, tackle the issue of whether “true” volunteers could sue 
under Title VII.89 
A few years after Pietras, the Second Circuit again addressed this 
issue.90 In York v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, the plaintiff 
was involved with the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, which provided her with clerical assistance, a workspace, 
publicity, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses.91 The 
plaintiff also used her position to network and to take tax 
deductions.92 The plaintiff sued the defendant after she stopped 
“working,” allegedly because she rebuffed sexual advances and was 
retaliated against for doing so.93 Relying on O’Connor v. Davis and 
Pietras, the court decided that the plaintiff was not an employee.94 
 
2008), where the court followed Pietras and concluded that there was a question of fact 
regarding whether volunteer firefighters were employees under the ADEA. The court based its 
conclusion on the fact that volunteer firefighters were entitled to receive several 
“significant benefits.” Id. 
 89.  Even prior to Pietras, the Second Circuit had determined that remuneration was a 
“preliminary question” which can be dispositive of the issue of whether an individual is an 
employee under Title VII. See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[O]nly where a ‘hire’ has occurred should the common-law agency analysis be 
undertaken.”). See also City of New York, 359 F.3d at 91–92, where the court observed that to 
prove “employee” status, one must first show that he was hired by the putative employer (by 
showing remuneration for work performed); Pastor v. P’ship for Children’s Rights, No. 10-
CV-5167(CBA)(LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140917, at *6 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2012), 
aff’d, 538 F. App’x 119 (2d Cir. 2013), (noting that volunteer attorneys were not 
“employees” despite receiving reimbursement for CLE courses and training relevant to their 
work). In Pastor, the court determined that these benefits were not sufficiently substantial, but 
were rather “merely incidental” to the work the volunteers performed. Id. at *6–7. 
 90.  York v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 91.  Id. at 124. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 125–26 (“We have refined the rather elliptical statutory definition to hold 
that ‘a prerequisite to considering whether an individual is [an employee] is that the individual 
have been hired in the first instance.’ Furthermore, we have stated ‘that the question of 
whether someone is or is not an employee under Title VII usually turns on whether he or she 
has received direct or indirect remuneration from the alleged employer.’. . . Where no financial 
benefit is obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no ‘plausible’ employment 
relationship of any sort can be said to exist because although ‘compensation by the putative 
employer to the putative employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient condition, . . . 
it is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.’”) (quoting 
O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16; Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist., 
180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999); Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 
71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
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The court then noted the type of benefits that could turn a 
volunteer relationship into an employment relationship; these 
benefits included salary, wages, vacation, sick pay, or health 
insurance.95 The court indicated that these benefits “must meet a 
minimum level of ‘significance,’ or substantiality, in order to find an 
employment relationship in the absence of more traditional 
compensation.”96 The court concluded that the benefits the plaintiff 
received “were merely incidental to the administration of the 
Association’s programs for the benefit of the bar at large.”97 The 
court also noted that “a party claiming to be an employee under 
Title VII must come forward with substantial benefits not merely 
incidental to the activity performed in order to satisfy this Circuit’s 
remuneration test.”98 The court then concluded that the plaintiff 
could not meet that standard.99 As demonstrated by the holdings in 
Pietras and York, the Second Circuit follows the majority approach 
of requiring a preliminary inquiry into remuneration before looking 
at other aspects of the “employment” relationship. 
Although the Third Circuit has not addressed this issue, district 
courts within the Third Circuit have done so.100 In Tawes v. 
Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., the plaintiff was a volunteer firefighter 
who sued under the ADA; one issue the court addressed was 
whether the volunteer firefighters were employees.101 This was 
relevant because, excluding the firefighters, the department never 
had more than three employees, making the ADA inapplicable.102 
After noting the ADA’s definition of “employee” was not helpful, 
the court looked to Title VII precedent by the Supreme Court.103 
 
 95. York, 286 F.3d at 126 (quoting Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100.  See, e.g., Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 786 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005). 
 101.  Id. at *1, 8–9. 
 102.  Id. at *8. 
 103.  Id. at *9–11. (“The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of Title VII ‘is 
plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities 
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group.’ ‘In enacting 
Title VII, Congress sought to eliminate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or 
limiting one’s livelihood simply because of one’s race, color, sex, religion or national origin.’ 
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The court cited to the Supreme Court for the proposition that 
in “the application of social legislation[,] employees are those who 
as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to 
which they render service.”104 The court continued, “[a]s such, 
when determining if an individual’s livelihood is denied or limited 
in an employment discrimination case, ‘one must examine the 
economic realities underlying the relationship between the 
individual and the so-called principal.’”105 Although the court 
appeared to be applying the “economic realities” test, the court 
specifically noted that “[c]ompensation is of course of paramount 
importance to such an inquiry.”106 
After recognizing how other courts have addressed the status of 
volunteers, the court analyzed the at-issue benefits.107 These benefits 
included “line-of-duty benefits” (secondary automobile insurance, 
death and disability benefits, funeral expenses, eligibility for workers’ 
compensation, a tax credit for the purchase of items necessary for the 
position, training, and uniforms and equipment used to perform the 
plaintiff ’s role as a firefighter), discounts on wireless phones (and 
phone service), and use of the department’s facilities.108 The court 
concluded that the “line-of-duty benefits” were insufficient to 
establish an employment relationship, as they “ha[d] no benefit 
outside of one’s role as a firefighter.”109 The court also concluded 
 
The same motivation can be seen in the text of the ADA, which states that the statute is 
applicable in ‘regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.’” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). 
 104.  Id. at *11 (quoting United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 185 (1970)). 
 105.  Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *11 (quoting Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 
1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)). 
 106.  Id. (citing O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)). The “economic 
realities” test focuses on whether the individual at issue is dependent upon the business or entity 
for which he “volunteers” his time. See W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. at 185. If courts adopt this test 
when deciding employment status of “volunteers,” most volunteers would not be considered 
employees because they are not relying on their volunteer positions as a means of support. 
 107.  Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *14–17. Specifically, the court looked at 
Graves v. Women’s Prof’l. Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Delaware 
Council on Crime & Justice, 780 F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del. 1992), aff’d, 975 F.2d 1549 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795–96 (E.D. Pa. 1987), and 
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). Graves, Smith, and 
Haavistola will be discussed in greater detail later in this Part of the Article. 
 108.  Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *3–4. 
 109.  Id. at *14. 
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that wireless phone and phone service discounts were insufficient.110 
The issue with which the court had the most trouble was the pension 
benefit.111 After analyzing that benefit, the court concluded that such 
a de minimis benefit could not create an employment relationship.112 
Finally, the court looked at how the parties viewed the 
relationship.113 According to the court, the parties viewed the 
relationship as being of a volunteer nature.114 The remuneration was 
no more than de minimis, and the plaintiff ’s work did not “allow[] 
him . . . to qualify to work in new and desirable fields.”115 Also, the 
plaintiff admitted that firefighting brought him “pride and intangible 
benefits.”116 While acknowledging the volunteers’ sacrifices, the 
court noted that the volunteers did not make those sacrifices as 
employees117 and concluded that the department was not an 
employer under the ADA.118 Therefore, at least one district court 
within the Third Circuit focused on remuneration as a preliminary 
inquiry when evaluating the at-issue relationship.119 
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Haavistola v. Cmty. 
Fire Co. of Rising Sun, where the court had to decide whether a 
 
 110.  Id. at *14–15. 
 111.  Id. at *15–16. 
 112.  Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 113.  Id. at *16–17. 
 114.  Id. at *16–17. 
 115.  Id. at *17. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id; See also Hall v. Del. Council on Crime & Justice, 780 F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del. 
1992), aff’d, 975 F.2d 1549 (3d Cir. 1992), where the court concluded that the defendant 
was not an employer because it did not have the required minimum of fifteen employees. The 
plaintiff argued that certain volunteers were employees, but the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument. Id. The only benefits to which the volunteers were entitled were free admission to 
an annual luncheon and reimbursement for work-related expenses. Id. The court cited Smith v. 
Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987), for the proposition that volunteers 
are not covered under Title VII, and that Title VII focuses on “compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment.” Hall, 780 F. Supp. at 244 (citing Smith, 657 F. Supp. 
at 794) (emphasis added). Predictably, the court determined that these forms of 
“compensation” were insufficient to establish an employment relationship. Id. 
 119.  See also Day v. Jeannette Baseball Ass’n, No. 12-267, 2013 WL 5786457, at *4 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2013) (observing that the common-law, multi-factor analysis is not 
applicable if the individual in question does not meet the threshold requirement of being a 
“hired party”). But see Houston v. Twp. of Randolph, 934 F. Supp. 2d 711, 739 n.26 (D.N.J. 
2013) (noting that the determination of employee status is based on the amount of control the 
“employer” has over the manner and means by which the work is completed). 
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volunteer firefighter could pursue a Title VII claim.120 This case 
involved a sexual assault and an indefinite suspension,121 but the 
critical issue was whether the plaintiff was an employee.122 The court 
started by quoting Title VII’s text and then framed the issue as being 
whether a member of a fire department “who receives no direct 
remuneration” is protected by Title VII.123 Citing to cases involving 
the employee/independent contractor distinction,124 the court noted 
the importance of the control the defendant had over the plaintiff, 
but it then noted that the control “loses some of its significance” 
when “compensation is not evident.”125 The court then focused on 
how this issue should be resolved with volunteers.126 The court relied 
on the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Graves,127 the Eighth Circuit’s use 
of Title VII’s legislative history,128 and the Eighth Circuit’s reliance 
on the dictionary definitions of the relevant terms and concluded: 
[C]entral to the meaning of these words is the idea of 
compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone 
who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other 
compensation to the person who provides the services—that person 
being the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to the 
putative employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient 
condition, but it is an essential condition to the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship.129 
 
 120.  Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 121.  Id. at 213–14. 
 122.  Id. at 219. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 219–20. The cases to which the Fourth Circuit referred were Garrett v. Phillips 
Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983), and Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947). 
 125.  Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220. 
 126.  Id. at 220–21. Specifically, the court discussed Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo 
Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990), and Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 
(E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 127.  Graves, 907 F.2d at 71. See infra this Part. 
 128.  Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220. The legislative history to which the court referred was 
the portion of the Congressional Register that noted that the “dictionary definitions” of 
“employee” and “employer” should govern those words’ meanings. See 110 CONG. REC. 7216 
(1964). As noted earlier, the court also cited to Berks Community Television, which relied on 
legislative history for the idea that volunteers are not covered under Title VII. Haavistola, 6 
F.3d at 221 (quoting Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. at 795)). 
 129.  Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220 (quoting Graves, 907 F.2d at 73) (emphasis added). 
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After discussing Graves and Smith, the court concluded that the 
current case fell somewhere between the two because the plaintiff 
did not receive any direct compensation, but she did receive some 
benefits.130 Specifically, the plaintiff received a disability pension, 
survivors’ benefits, scholarships for dependents in case of disability or 
death, a state flag in the event of death while serving in the line of 
duty, group life insurance, tuition reimbursement, workers’ 
compensation coverage, tax benefits, the ability to buy a special 
registration plate, access to certification to become a paramedic, and 
some other benefits under federal law.131 The district court had 
concluded that the plaintiff was a volunteer, but the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that this determination could not be made as a matter of 
law.132 Rather, the issue of whether the benefits “represent[ed] 
indirect but significant remuneration as [the plaintiff] contends or 
inconsequential incidents of an otherwise gratuitous relationship as 
[the defendant] argues . . .”133 was a question of fact; if the factfinder 
determined that the relationship was a gratuitous one, the plaintiff 
could not pursue her claim.134  
Thus, this is another example of where, instead of addressing 
whether volunteers should be able to pursue discrimination claims, the 
court avoided the issue by focusing on whether the plaintiff was truly 
a volunteer.135 And it is another example of a court requiring an initial 
inquiry into remuneration when evaluating employment status. 
 
 130.  Id. at 221. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 221–22. 
 133.  Id. at 222. In a district court case from within the Fourth Circuit, the court 
determined that there was a question of fact regarding whether the “employer’s” payment of 
an intern’s tuition “constitute[d] ‘indirect but significant remuneration’ or ‘inconsequential 
incidents of an otherwise gratuitous relationship.’” See Wooten v. Epworth United Methodist 
Church, No. 1:06-CV-778, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50716, at *15–16 (M.D.N.C. July 11, 
2007) (quoting Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222). 
 134.  Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222. On remand, the jury concluded that the plaintiff was not 
an employee. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 839 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D. Md. 1994). 
 135.  The court was, however, acknowledging that volunteers could not pursue federal 
discrimination claims; if they could, then the inquiry into the plaintiff’s status would not have 
been necessary. See also Finkle v. Howard Cty., Md., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784–87 (D. Md. 
2014) (following Haavistola and concluding that a person applying for a volunteer position 
could pursue a Title VII claim because of the “line-of-duty” benefits available to the plaintiff). 
But see Evans v. Wilkinson, 609 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D. Md. 2009) (deciding that the plaintiff 
was not an employee despite the existence of a “length of service” benefits program, 
homeowner’s assistance for first-time homeowners, and a scholarship program); Blankenship v. 
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Recently, the Fifth Circuit determined that remuneration was 
critical to an employment relationship, and that before a court looks 
to other factors, there must first be a finding of sufficient 
remuneration.136 In Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, a 
volunteer firefighter sued under Title VII.137 The court noted that 
“the existence of an employment relationship in the volunteer 
context [was] an issue of first impression,” and provided a thorough 
analysis of the issue.138 The court cited the Supreme Court’s 
observation that Title VII’s definition of “employee” was 
“completely circular and explain[ed] nothing.”139  
The court then noted that when a statute provided such an 
unhelpful definition, Congress intended courts to utilize the 
“conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine.”140 After discussing the common-law 
test, the court addressed how to apply the test to the volunteer 
situation.141 After analyzing how other courts have handled this issue, 
the court ultimately sided with the majority approach.142 
 
City of Portsmouth, 372 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (E.D. Va. 2005), (noting that the plaintiff, an 
auxiliary police officer who was bringing suit under the ADEA and under Title VII, was not an 
employee under either statute because he did not receive compensation or monetary benefits). 
 136.  Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 137.  Id. at 432. 
 138.  Id. at 432–38. 
 139.  Id. at 434 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)). 
The Fifth Circuit also noted that prior to this opinion, the district courts within the Fifth Circuit 
had reached different conclusions regarding how to analyze this issue. Id. at 435 n.2. 
 140.  Id. at 434 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 500 (2006)); see also Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 
F.3d 361, 371 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has stressed that, ‘when Congress has 
used the term “employee” without defining it, . . . Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.’”) 
(quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989)). 
 141.  Juino, 717 F.3d at 434. Specifically, the court described the test in the 
following manner: 
The economic-realities portion of the test asks whether putative employees, “as a 
matter of economic reality, are dependent upon the business to which they render 
service.” The common law control portion of the test, which courts should 
emphasize over the economic realities portion, assesses “the extent to which the one 
for whom the work is being done has the right to control the details and means by 
which the work is to be performed.” 
Id. (citations omitted). The court then went on to describe the factors that were relevant to 
this analysis: 
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The court concluded that “[l]ike the majority of our sister 
circuits, we will ‘turn to common-law principles to analyze the 
character of an economic relationship only in situations that plausibly 
approximate an employment relationship.’”143 According to the 
court, it was Congress’s role to change this situation if Congress felt 
it was necessary to protect individuals such as the plaintiff.144 This is 
one more example of a United States Court of Appeals adopting the 
majority approach and requiring an inquiry into remuneration before 
evaluating other aspects of the at-issue relationship. 
 
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work usually is done 
under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) 
the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the “employer” or the 
individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the 
length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, 
whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is 
terminated [,] i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and explanation; 
(7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the 
business of the “employer”[,] (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement 
benefits; (10) whether the “employer” pays social security taxes; and (11) the 
intention of the parties. 
Id. at 434–35 (quoting Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272–73 
(5th Cir. 1988)). 
 142.  Id. at 435–39 (“After consideration of both approaches, we adopt the threshold-
remuneration test, as we find it uniquely suited to assessing a plausible employment 
relationship within the volunteer context. In support, we conclude that O’Connor is persuasive, 
i.e., that a volunteer is distinguishable from the employee-independent contractor situation 
because there is a prerequisite of a ‘hire’ in the latter . . . . This point is further borne out by the 
fact that a volunteer is generally not an ‘employee,’ and thus no ‘hire’ has occurred since there is no 
receipt of remuneration supporting an employer-employee relationship.”) (emphasis added) 
(relying on O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) and on the EEOC 
Compliance Manual § 2-III(A)(1)(c)). 
 143.  Id. at 439 (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115). 
 144.  Id. (citing O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 119). The court then analyzed the type of 
remuneration the plaintiff received (a $2.00-per-call fee, life insurance, uniform and badge, 
firefighting gear, and firefighter training) and concluded that these benefits were not sufficient 
to establish an employment relationship. Id. at 439–40. In a pre-Juino opinion, the Southern 
District of Texas concluded that a plaintiff was not an employee despite the fact he would have 
been able to take certification courses at no cost, make connections with individuals who might 
have been able to help him obtain permanent employment, and obtain experience that would 
have made him a more attractive candidate for a full-time position. See Moran v. Harris Cty., 
No. H-07-582, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2007). When 
distinguishing between employees and volunteers, the court stated the following: “What 
distinguishes an employee from a volunteer is that in exchange for his labor, an employee is 
paid—directly or indirectly—money.” Moran, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *3. 
03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016 8:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
140 
The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, but district 
courts within that circuit have done so, with inconsistent results.145 
In Holder v. Town of Bristol, the plaintiff was a volunteer reserve 
police officer who was subjected to sexual harassment and eventually 
resigned.146 The court concluded that the plaintiff was not an 
employee; the defendant was not an employer; and therefore, the 
plaintiff could not pursue his claim.147 There were thirteen full-time 
employees, although there would be as many as twenty-five 
employees if the reserve police officers were considered employees.148 
When addressing the officers’ status, the plaintiff urged the court to 
use the “economic realities” test.149 The court noted that this test is 
more appropriate when distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors, and that using the economic realities test in 
the volunteer context is “like using a screwdriver when the job 
calls for a wrench.”150 
The court in Holder noted that other courts “uniformly held 
that remuneration in exchange for services is an essential condition 
to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.”151 The court 
also recognized that remuneration need not be direct; salaries or an 
hourly wage are not essential.152 In fact, the court addressed cases in 
which one of the benefits was an increase in the chance of being 
hired on a full-time basis.153 
 
 145.  See e.g., Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09-CV-32(PPS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
85878 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009); Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012). More recently, another district court from 
within the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the circuit split on this topic and the fact that the 
Seventh Circuit has not yet answered this question. See Geraty v. Village of Antioch, No. 09 C 
6992, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158861, at *4–19 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2014). 
 146.  Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *1. 
 147.  Id. at *17–18. 
 148.  Id. at *5. 
 149.  Id. at *5–6. 
 150.  Id. at *6–7. 
 151.  Id. at *7 (relying on York v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 
2002); Daggitt v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 304A, 245 F.3d 
981, 987 (8th Cir. 2001); and Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244 
(11th Cir. 1998)). 
 152.  Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *8. 
 153.  Id. at *12. One of the cases to which the court referred was Rafi v. Thompson, No. 
02-2356 (JR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78696, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2006), where the 
plaintiff was able to continue with his Title VII claim after he alleged that his volunteer 
position provided a “clear pathway to employment.” 
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Eventually, the court analyzed the benefits the plaintiff 
received.154 These included the use of police equipment, a uniform, a 
dry-cleaning allowance, workers’ compensation and disability 
insurance, a life insurance policy if death were to occur in the line of 
duty, training, and the possibility of future employment with the 
department.155 In the court’s view, these benefits were insufficient, 
because some were “incidental to [the plaintiff ’s] volunteer duties 
and ha[d] no independent value,”156 the insurance benefits were not 
“guaranteed,” and the policies benefitted the town as much as they 
benefitted the plaintiff.157 Finally, the court concluded that the 
training and the potential for permanent employment were 
insufficient to create an employment relationship:158 “without 
more . . . training related to the volunteer duties, networking 
opportunities, and the possibility of future employment aren’t 
appreciable enough to create an employment relationship.”159 The 
court therefore concluded that the relationship was “more akin to 
community service than gainful employment.”160 Thus, the plaintiff 
could not pursue his claim.161 
 
 154.  Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *13. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at *14. 
 158.  Id. at *15−17. 
 159.  Id. at *15 (relying on York v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122, 126 (2d 
Cir. 2002) and Moran v. Harris Cnty., No. H-07-582, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *1 
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2007)). Similarly, in Moran, the court noted that “[w]hat distinguishes an 
employee from a volunteer is that in exchange for his labor, an employee is paid—directly or 
indirectly—money.” 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *3. The court concluded that 
networking opportunities, the ability to take “classes at no cost,” and the possibility of “on-
the-job experience filling in for actual deputy constables” were not sufficient to establish an 
employment relationship. Id. 
 160.  Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *17. 
 161.  Id. at *17−18. For another district court opinion from within the Seventh Circuit, 
see Doe v. Lee, 943 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2013). In Doe, the court acknowledged that 
although the control test is usually a good way to distinguish between employees and 
independent contractors, that test is not ideal when distinguishing between employees and 
volunteers. Id. at 875. The plaintiff in Doe served in two capacities; on some occasions, she 
served “as an intern,” and on other occasions she assisted the police with sting operations. Id. 
at 876. After reviewing several of the cases cited in this Article, the court determined that 
while the plaintiff was an intern, she was not an “employee.” Id. at 876−77. With respect to 
her role in the sting operations, the plaintiff received a reduction in the balance of her 
outstanding parking tickets; she signed a document that described these sting operations as 
“temporary employment”; the plaintiff was covered under workers’ compensation insurance; 
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More recently, another district court from within the Seventh 
Circuit adopted the minority approach and looked at remuneration 
as only one factor to use when evaluating employment status.162 In 
Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, the court looked at the totality of 
the circumstances when deciding whether an individual was an 
employee.163 Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,164 the court noted that employee 
status is determined only by evaluating numerous factors of the at-
issue relationship.165 
The court also referred to the EEOC Compliance Manual and 
noted that when evaluating this issue, courts should look to all 
factors of the relationship, and that no one factor is dispositive.166 
The court in Volling noted that the Seventh Circuit “has squarely 
rejected the ‘tyranny of labels’ advocated by the defendants in 
brandishing the term ‘volunteer’ as a shield to ward off liability 
under Title VII.”167 The court also cited with approval the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion in Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.:168 
As the Sixth Circuit noted in Bryson, treating remuneration only as 
one of many factors bearing on the issue of status as an “employee” 
 
her supervisor controlled if and when the plaintiff would participate in these operations; these 
characteristics, among other factors, made this relationship appear to be a more typical 
“employment” relationship. Id. As a result, the court determined that there was a fact issue 
regarding whether the plaintiff was an employee when she participated in the sting 
operations. Id. 
 162.  Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
171623, at *20−35 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012). I realize the discussion of this case could be 
placed in the next Section of this Article, but I placed it in this Section to avoid separating 
district court opinions from within the same circuit. 
 163.  Id. at *21−24. The district court relied partially on EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown 
& Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that a court should look at 
several factors when determining whether an individual is an employee under Title VII. 
Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *23−24. The court also relied on the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). Volling, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *21−28. 
 164.  490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 165.  Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *22 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 490 U.S. at 751−52). 
 166.  Id. at *22. See supra note 36 for a list of factors the EEOC considers when 
determining employee status. 
 167.  Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *23. 
 168.  656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011). Bryson will be addressed in Section IV.B of 
this Article. 
03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016  8:57 PM 
117 No Good Deed Goes Unpunished 
 143 
“comports with Darden’s instruction that, when evaluating a 
particular relationship, ‘all of the incidents of the relationship must 
be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.’” Based 
on the Supreme Court’s instructions, the Court agrees with the 
Sixth Circuit’s view. The question and degree of remuneration are 
simply factors to be considered, along with many others, in assessing 
whether a worker is an “employee” for purposes of Title VII.169 
In addition, the court stated the following regarding the need to 
look at the totality of the circumstances rather than solely at the 
remuneration issue: 
It is clear that remuneration is an important factor in defining an 
employment relationship. But the Supreme Court’s instruction to 
evaluate the question using the common-law principles of agency, 
and its inclusion of considerations that do not pertain to 
remuneration on its non-exhaustive list of relevant factors, confirms 
that it is not the exclusive consideration. Consistent with that 
instruction, this Court does not draw any bright line requiring an 
“employee” to be salaried or that she receive substantial pecuniary 
remuneration. The question is whether the plaintiffs have alleged 
facts sufficient to make a plausible claim that they meet the 
requirements for Title VII protection . . . .170 
After evaluating the various factors, the court decided that the 
plaintiff ’s allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.171 
Therefore, this court determined that the totality-of-the-
circumstances test was the applicable test, and that remuneration was 
only one factor in that analysis.172 Until the Seventh Circuit answers 
 
 169.  Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171628, at *26 (internal citations omitted) (citing 
Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354). 
 170.  Id. at *33. In reaching the holding, the court noted that the defendants controlled 
which shifts the plaintiffs worked; the “[p]laintiffs []were required to wear uniforms”; the 
plaintiffs “had to go through probationary periods”; and there was a “well-defined chain of 
command.” Id. at *30−31. All of these facts demonstrated a level of control which the 
defendant had over the plaintiff. Id. at *30−32. 
 171.  Id. at *32−33 (stating that “[a] workplace is not necessarily any different for a non-
compensated volunteer than it is for a compensated ’employee,’ and while both are generally 
free to quit if they don’t like the conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither 
should have to quit to avoid sexual, racial, or other unlawful discrimination and harassment”). 
 172.  Id. at *33. But see Love v. Cmty. Nutrition Network, No. 09-CV-4937, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 133011, at *24−26 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2010) (prior to the Volling opinion, the 
Northern District of Illinois appeared to endorse the threshold remuneration test). 
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this question, there will continue to be uncertainty within 
that jurisdiction. 
The Eighth Circuit addressed the status of volunteers when it 
handed down its often-cited decision in Graves v. Women’s Prof’l 
Rodeo Ass’n, where a man sued the Women’s Professional Rodeo 
Association (WPRA), claiming it violated Title VII by not allowing 
him to participate in WPRA events.173 The court addressed whether 
WPRA members were employees; if they were employees, the WPRA 
would be subject to Title VII’s prohibitions.174 If the members were 
not employees, the WPRA would be immune from Title VII 
liability.175 The district court noted that the “WPRA . . . [did] not 
pay wages, withhold taxes, or pay insurance.”176 Although the WPRA 
had rules regarding WPRA events, that level of control was not 
critical in determining whether the members were employees.177 
The court also focused on the ordinary usage and dictionary 
definitions of the relevant terms, including “employee,” “employer,” 
and “employ.”178 Relying on the definitions of those terms in 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,179 the court 
concluded the following: 
[C]entral to the meaning of these words is the idea of 
compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone 
who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other 
compensation to the person who provides services—that person 
being the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to the 
putative employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient 
condition, but it is an essential condition to the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship.180 
The court then noted that the WPRA does not compensate its 
members; the competition winners are paid by event sponsors; and 
that “[f]or most [WPRA] members, belonging to WPRA and 
 
 173.  907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 174.  Id. at 72. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 73. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit looked at the definitions of “employee,” 
“employer,” and “employ.” Id. 
 179.  Id. (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 743 (unabridged) (1981)). 
 180.  Id. 
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competing on the professional rodeo circuit is not a remunerative 
proposition.”181 In concluding that members of the WPRA are not 
employees, the court observed the following: “The relationship 
between WPRA and its members simply bears no resemblance to 
that between an employer and employee . . . : no compensation is 
made, only prize money won . . . . In addition, membership in 
WPRA entails no duty of service to WPRA or anyone else . . . .”182 
Finally, the court emphasized the importance of the first part of 
the two-part inquiry regarding employment status.183 Specifically, the 
court referred to that inquiry regarding an employment relationship 
as a “crucial and elementary initial inquiry” that could not be 
avoided.184 The court then concluded that the relationship between 
the WPRA and its members was not even close to an employment 
relationship.185 The court stated the following: “[T]he absence of any 
compensation flowing to WPRA members by reason of their 
membership, together with the absence of any duty of service owed 
by members to WPRA . . . , suffices to exclude WPRA from being an 
‘employer’ of its members under Title VII . . . .”186 Thus, this is 
another court requiring a plaintiff to overcome the remuneration test 
before even attempting to argue any additional test for establishing 
employee status. This is the majority approach, with most courts 
deciding there must be sufficient remuneration before someone can 
be considered an employee.187 
 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. In further rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the court noted the following: 
Courts have turned to analyses such as the “economic realities” test and “right to 
control” test under Title VII only in situations that plausibly approximate an 
employment relationship. In the case at hand, WPRA is so unlike an employer to its 
members that plunging into questions of control or economic realities is on the order 
of considering whether mitigating circumstances were present during the commission 
of a crime before determining whether there is a corpus delicti. Id. at 74. 
 183.  Id. at 73. 
 184.  Id. The court’s exact language was the following: “Only by skipping this crucial 
and elementary initial inquiry—whether there exists an employment relationship, according to 
the ordinary meaning of the words—and jumping straight into verbal manipulation of the case 
law tests for an employment relationship, can Graves make an implausible argument sound 
even marginally plausible.” Id. at 73. 
 185.  Id. at 73–74. 
 186.  Id. at 74. 
 187.  See infra and supra this Part. 
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The Tenth Circuit also requires sufficient remuneration before 
an individual can be considered an employee.188 In McGuinness v. 
Univ. of New Mexico Sch. of Med., the plaintiff brought several ADA 
claims against a medical school.189 The lower court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.190 In its 
opinion, the Tenth Circuit eventually addressed the plaintiff ’s 
“association discrimination” claim.191 That claim fell under Title I of 
the ADA, which governs employment.192 Thus, the student had to 
establish an employment relationship between him and the medical 
school.193 The court concluded that no such relationship existed: 
“[The plaintiff] has failed to show the existence of such an 
employment relationship between himself and the medical school. 
Unless a student receives remuneration for the work he performs, he 
is not considered an employee.”194 
The court emphasized the lack of remuneration, and it stated 
that the following facts were irrelevant in determining whether an 
employment relationship existed: (1) the plaintiff “completed federal 
employment applications”; (2) the plaintiff “took a federal oath of 
office”; and (3) the plaintiff “was covered by the New Mexico Tort 
Claims Act . . . .” The court ended its discussion by noting that a 
university “may confer certain benefits on an individual and exercise 
a modicum of control over him without establishing a master-servant 
relationship.”195 Thus, the plaintiff was not an employee, and his 
ADA “association discrimination” claim failed.196 The Tenth Circuit 
 
 188.  McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998). But 
see Scott v. City of Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (W.D. Okla. 2005), where a district 
court within the Tenth Circuit stated that when determining employment status, a “[c]ourt 
must consider the totality of the circumstances.” The court in Scott then noted that courts use 
a “hybrid test,” which looks at both remuneration and the level of control the putative 
employer exercises over the putative employee. Id. 
 189.  McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 976−77. 
 190.  Id. at 977. 
 191.  Id. at 977–80. 
 192.  Id. at 979. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. (relying on O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) and 5 U.S.C. 
§ 5351(2) (2012)). 
 195.  Id. (relying on Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71, 72−73 
(8th Cir. 1990)). 
 196.  McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 979. The court also noted that the plaintiff failed to 
establish that the medical school discriminated against him. Id. at 980. 
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therefore appears to be another court that requires a preliminary 
inquiry into remuneration before looking at other aspects of the 
“employment” relationship. 
The Eleventh Circuit has also decided that whether an individual 
qualifies as an employee hinges on remuneration.197 In Llampallas v. 
Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., the court addressed whether the plaintiff 
was an employee of a condominium association.198 The plaintiff 
served as a member and vice president of the association.199 When 
the other board members ousted her, she sued both the 
condominium association and her true “employer” under Title 
VII.200 The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed.201  
Before addressing the merits of the Title VII claim, the court 
determined whether the plaintiff was an employee of the 
condominium association.202 The court noted that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against “any individual,” and that the plaintiff could 
have tried to argue that because of this language, she was protected 
under the statute.203 The court then dismissed the argument, relying 
on precedent which had determined that only employees could sue 
under Title VII.204 Also, relying on Congressional intent, the court 
observed that “Congress intended to limit the scope of the Act to 
specific employment relationships; thus, the statute provides relief 
only against ‘employers’ as defined under the statute . . . . Hence, 
courts have almost universally held that the scope of the term ‘any 
individual’ is limited to employees.”205 
 
 197.  Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 198.  Id. at 1242−44. 
 199.  Id. at 1241. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 1239. 
 202.  Id. at 1242−44. 
 203.  Id. at 1242−43. 
 204.  Id. (relying on McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. 
Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1996); and Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 
794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. 
Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003)). But see id. at 1243 (citing Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 
F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing a broad interpretation of Title VII and not 
limiting the term “individual” to “employees”). 
 205.  Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243. 
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The court also concluded that Title VII’s forms of relief 
provided evidence that only employees were protected.206 To reach 
this conclusion, the court also focused on Title VII’s 1972 
amendments, which used the phrase “employees or applicants 
for employment.”207 
The court then turned to Title VII’s definition of “employee.”208 
Noting that the definition was not useful, the court stated that “only 
individuals who receive compensation from an employer can be 
deemed ‘employees’ under the statute.”209 Relying on O’Connor, the 
court observed: “Where no financial benefit is obtained by the 
purported employee from the employer, no plausible employment 
relationship of any sort can be said to exist because . . . 
compensation . . . is an essential condition to the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship.”210 Because the plaintiff did not 
receive compensation from the condominium association, she was 
not an employee.211 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit is yet another court 
to follow the majority approach and require remuneration before the 
court engages in further analysis of the employment relationship. 
Finally, although the D.C. Circuit has not directly addressed this 
issue, a district court within the D.C. Circuit focused on the benefits 
the plaintiff received in order to determine employment status.212 In 
Rafi v. Thompson, the court addressed whether the volunteer 
positions the plaintiff sought at the National Human Genome 
Research Institute and the National Institutes of Health constituted 
 
 206.  Id. (observing that Title VII allows for reinstatement, hiring, and back pay, which 
are remedies that would not be applicable to volunteers). 
 207.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1994)); 
and H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2159−60). 
 208.  Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243. 
 209.  Id. (relying on O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115−16 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 210.  Id. at 1243 (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115−16). 
 211.  Id. at 1244. For a more recent case from a district court within the Eleventh 
Circuit, see Vazquez v. Orange Cty. Service Unit, No. 6:12-CV-1595-Orl-37(DAB), 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32728, at *5–78 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014), where the court noted that an 
employment relationship is most often indicated by whether the individual is on the employer’s 
payroll, that one must receive compensation to be considered an employee, and that 
compensation was the equivalent of salary or wages. 
 212.  Rafi v. Thompson, No. 02-2356 (JR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78696 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 30, 2006). 
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“employment.”213 The court had previously addressed this issue and 
asked the parties to conduct additional discovery.214 The court did so 
because it had earlier decided that one of the benefits, “a clear 
pathway to employment . . . might constitute sufficient 
compensation to bring [National Institutes of Health] volunteers 
under Title VII.”215 The plaintiff identified several former volunteers 
who were hired as full-time employees.216 Additionally, the plaintiff 
argued that the volunteer position would have provided him with an 
“increased opportunity to participate in [National Institutes of 
Health’s]” genetics program, which would have provided him with 
training in his fields of expertise.217 Relying on Haavistola, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff “made a plausible showing that the 
volunteer positions for which he applied would qualify as 
‘employment’ under Title VII and the ADEA.”218 Thus, it appeared 
that the court was looking at remuneration (albeit a different type of 
remuneration) as a threshold issue to evaluate when 
determining employment status.219 
When determining employment status, most courts look at the 
issue of remuneration before evaluating other factors. Although this 
is the majority approach, some courts ignore the threshold 
remuneration issue and look to the totality of the circumstances 
when making this determination; the courts that take this approach 
do so based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s instructions on this 
 
 213.  Id. at *1. 
 214.  Id. at *1–2. 
 215.  Id. at *1. 
 216.  Id. at *2. 
 217.  Id. at *3. 
 218.  Id. at *3. Although the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on this issue, it also 
noted that more evidence from the plaintiff would be required in order for him to “establish 
his prima facie case of disparate treatment in hiring.” Id. at *4–5. 
 219.  See also Dean v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp., 509 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52–56 (D.D.C. 
2007), where the court seemed to rely on the threshold remuneration test but also engaged in 
a multi-factor analysis. 
03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016 8:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
150 
issue,220 and on a provision of the EEOC Compliance Manual, which 
also requires a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.221 
B. The Minority Approach 
Although most courts require an initial inquiry into 
remuneration before looking at other aspects of the parties’ 
relationship, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits take a different 
approach.222 Specifically, those courts look at remuneration simply as 
one factor when deciding the nature of the relationship.223 Cases 
from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits will be addressed in this Section of 
the Article, immediately following a discussion of a district court 
opinion from within the First Circuit, which took a similar approach. 
The District of Massachusetts addressed this issue in Mahoney v. 
Morgan when it had to decide whether a volunteer could count 
toward the fifteen-employee threshold under the ADA.224 The court 
addressed the employment status of several individuals (and 
repeatedly referred to the multi-factor analysis while evaluating the 
individuals’ employment status). One of the individuals, the husband 
of the owner of a veterinary clinic, performed some “work” but was 
not paid.225 The court had to decide whether this individual qualified 
as an employee and referred to Reid, Clackamas, Darden, and the 
EEOC’s position regarding the need to look at the totality of the 
circumstances, not simply at remuneration.226 In fact, the court 
 
 220.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Also, some of the courts that have 
adopted the threshold remuneration test have argued that because there was an obvious 
payment in all three Supreme Court cases, the Court bypassed its analysis of the threshold 
remuneration test. 
 221.  See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1). See also supra notes 36, 37, 67 and 
accompanying text. 
 222.  See infra Section IV.B. Although the First Circuit has not directly addressed this 
issue, a district court from within the First Circuit relied on a First Circuit case and adopted a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Mahoney v. Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 97224 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010) (relying on Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 
(1st Cir. 2009)). In Mahoney, the court noted that lack of remuneration was not solely 
determinative of employee status. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24. 
 223.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 224.  Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *16–17. 
 225.  Id. at *23–24. 
 226.  Id. at *17–20. Admittedly, although the court identified several factors to evaluate 
when determining employment status, the court focused on the type of “payment” the 
owner’s husband received, which could come in the form of “benefits.” Id. at *23–24. 
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started its discussion of employment status by apparently rejecting 
the threshold remuneration test and noting that the husband did not 
receive payment but that “[t]he lack of evidence of payment . . . is 
not necessarily a bar to a determination of employee status because 
some volunteers are covered by the ADA.”227  
Relying on the EEOC’s Compliance Manual, the court observed 
that an individual can be an employee if he receives benefits in 
exchange for services.228 Here, the individual was covered under his 
wife’s health insurance plan, and the court believed that this was one 
factor that weighed in favor of finding employee status.229 In 
concluding this issue, the court stated: “[A] reasonable jury could 
find that [the husband] qualifies as an employee.”230 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on a case from the First Circuit that 
appeared to adopt the minority multi-factor test, but emphasized the 
issue of control.231 Therefore, although the First Circuit has not yet 
definitively adopted a position regarding how to determine the 
employment status of a “volunteer,” at least one district court from 
within that jurisdiction has appeared to adopt the totality-of-the-
circumstances test.232 
 
However, the court used all factors when evaluating other individuals’ employment status. 
Id. at *21–24. 
 227.  Id. at *23. Although some courts have determined that some “volunteers” are 
covered under federal anti-discrimination statutes, those courts actually decided that those 
individuals were not truly volunteers, but employees; true volunteers are not covered by federal 
anti-discrimination statutes under current precedent. 
 228.  Id. at *24. In addition to relying on the EEOC Compliance Manual, the court also 
relied on the previously discussed Supreme Court Clackamas opinion, in which the Court 
looked at several factors (and focused on the level of control), and on the First Circuit opinion 
in Lopez, which similarly focused on control, but evaluated the totality of the circumstances. 
Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *18–19. Admittedly, the Mahoney court focused 
on the benefits the individual received, but it is clear that the court evaluated all factors, not 
simply remuneration, throughout its analyses of the employment status of the various at-
issue individuals. 
 229.  Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24. 
 230.  Id. at *24. 
 231.  See id. at *17–28. Specifically, the court relied on Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 
69, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2009) (utilizing the multi-factor test articulated in the EEOC Compliance 
Manual, and focusing on the issue of control). Lopez did not, however, involve volunteers. Id. 
at 72–73. The Mahoney court also cited to the Supreme Court’s opinions in Clackamas, Reid, 
and Darden. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *18–20. See also supra note 228 and 
accompanying text. 
 232.  As noted previously, the First Circuit has applied the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test, although that case did not involve volunteers. Lopez, 588 F.3d at 72–73. 
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One of the few courts of appeals to avoid initially analyzing 
remuneration when evaluating an “employment” relationship is the 
Sixth Circuit.233 In Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 
the plaintiff sued under Title VII.234 The court had to answer 
whether volunteer firefighters were employees; if they were, the fire 
department would have been subject to Title VII’s prohibitions.235 If 
they were not employees, the fire department would not have 
reached the fifteen-employee minimum, and the district court would 
have had to dismiss the case.236 Although the EEOC determined that 
the fire department was a covered employer, the district court 
disagreed.237 The district court decided that the “compensation 
analysis is an antecedent inquiry that must be examined prior to 
application of the economic realities or common-law agency tests.”238 
After the parties conducted additional discovery, the district court 
determined that the benefits were insufficient to create an 
issue of fact.239 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that, in some cases, 
this is a mixed question of law and fact, which must be answered by 
the factfinder.240 The court then addressed Title VII’s relevant, but 
unhelpful, definitions and how courts have determined employment 
status.241 The Sixth Circuit noted that the definition of “employee” 
was not helpful, and that common law agency principles were 
appropriate to apply.242 The court then cited the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Darden and explained the factors that go into 
determining whether an employment relationship exists; these factors 
set out the specific “rules” for the relationship.243 
 
 233.  Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 234.  Id. at 350. 
 235.  Id. at 350–51. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. The EEOC concluded that the firefighters were employees because the 
department exercised sufficient control over the firefighters and because the firefighters were 
compensated for their services despite not being on the department’s payroll. Id. at 350. 
 238.  Id. at 351 (quoting Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 
527, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2008)). 
 239.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 351. 
 240.  Id. at 352. 
 241.  Id. at 352–55. 
 242.  Id. at 352. 
 243.  Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992)). 
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As previously noted, these factors are typically used in the 
employee/independent contractor context,244 and the court 
acknowledged that it had not used this analysis to distinguish 
between employees and volunteers.245 The court first observed that 
other courts had included remuneration as a factor in their 
analyses.246 Strangely, the courts to which the Sixth Circuit cited 
actually used remuneration as a threshold inquiry.247 In fact, several of 
the opinions to which the Sixth Circuit cited were addressed in 
Section IV.A of this Article.248 The court then addressed the EEOC’s 
position that volunteers are not usually protected, but that an 
individual could be a protected employee if he receives sufficient 
benefits.249 And, as was noted, in this case, the EEOC had decided 
that the firefighters were employees, in part because they were 
compensated despite not being on the payroll.250 
The Sixth Circuit then decided that remuneration was not an 
independent, antecedent inquiry.251 Criticizing the district court’s 
decision to adopt the Second Circuit’s test from United States v. City 
of New York,252 “which requires a plaintiff to establish first that she is 
a ‘hired party’ by showing that she received ‘substantial benefits not 
merely incidental to the activity performed,’ before the district court 
may consider the common-law agency test,” the court observed 
the following: 
In this case, each individual firefighter-member is a “hired party” in 
that each has a contractual relationship with the Department—the 
 
 244.  Id. at 352. 
 245.  Id. at 352–53. 
 246.  Id. at 353. 
 247.  Specifically, some of the cases the court cited for the proposition that remuneration 
was a “factor” in this analysis include: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 
1243–44 (11th Cir. 1998); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th 
Cir. 1998); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 220–21 (4th Cir. 1993); 
and Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73–74 (8th Cir. 1990). As was 
discussed previously, the courts in these cases required remuneration as a threshold inquiry 
before progressing to any other type of test to determine employment status. See supra 
Section IV.A. 
 248.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 249.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 353. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. at 353–55. 
 252.  359 F.3d 83, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2004). 
03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016 8:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
154 
firefighter-member provides firefighting services to the Department 
in exchange for benefits from the Department, including worker’s 
compensation coverage, insurance coverage, gift cards, personal use 
of the Department’s facilities and assets, training, and access to an 
emergency fund. . . . But we decline to adopt the Second Circuit’s 
view that, to be a “hired party,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
she received significant remuneration.253 
The court then explained its conclusion, which was based on the 
court’s belief that the cases upon which the Second Circuit relied did 
not require an independent inquiry regarding remuneration.254 The 
court also noted that its approach was consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s Darden opinion in that “no one factor” (including 
remuneration) was dispositive.255 Specifically, the court stated that 
“no one factor, including remuneration, is decisive, and therefore no 
one factor is an independent antecedent requirement.”256 The court 
also commented that the multi-factor test was appropriate because 
“alleged employee-employer relationships can be complex and may 
not fit neatly into one particular categorization.”257  
Applying its interpretation to the facts of the case, the court in 
Bryson noted that the firefighters received workers’ compensation 
coverage; they received insurance coverage; they received gift cards; 
they were authorized to use the fire department’s facilities; and they 
also had access to an emergency fund.258 Also, some firefighters 
received a lump-sum retirement payment while others received 
hourly wages.259 Because the district court failed to consider aspects 
of the relationship other than remuneration, the Sixth Circuit 
remanded the case back to the district court.260 
 
 253.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. at 355. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Id. at 355–56. For a more recent opinion from a district court within the Sixth 
Circuit, see Crim v. Village of Bellville, No. 1:12-CV-3065, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98367 
(N.D. Ohio July 12, 2013). In Crim, the court followed Bryson and noted that in determining 
whether an employment relationship exists, the court must apply the common-law agency test, 
which looks at all aspects of the relationship, including remuneration. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98367, at *10. But see Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Ohio 1996), where 
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Judge Gibbons concurred in part and dissented in part.261 She 
believed that a remand was necessary but “disagree[d] with the 
majority’s conclusion that, when evaluating whether an individual is 
an ‘employee’ . . . the court must weigh remuneration as merely one 
factor.”262 Relying on Haavistola, Pietras, and Graves,263 she noted 
that a threshold showing of “indirect but significant remuneration” 
or “significant benefits” was required to establish employee status.264 
Also, relying on United States v. City of New York, she observed: 
First, the plaintiff must show she was hired by the putative 
employer. To prove that she was hired, she must establish that she 
received remuneration in some form from her work. This 
remuneration need not be a salary, but must consist of substantial 
benefits not merely incidental to the activity performed. Once 
plaintiff furnishes proof that her putative employer remunerated 
her for services she performed, we look to the thirteen factors 
articulated by the Supreme Court in . . . Reid . . . , to determine 
whether an employment relationship exists.265 
Relying on the majority approach, Judge Gibbons reiterated that 
an application of a common-law agency test was appropriate only 
after a finding that the relationship could “plausibly approximate an 
employment relationship.”266 And when there is no financial benefit 
from the purported employer, there could be no “‘plausible’ 
 
the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that she was an employee. The court applied the 
economic realities test and decided that the “compensation” the plaintiff received (“emotional 
benefit,” in-kind services, and death benefits if she was killed while working for the defendant) 
was insufficient to confer employee status. Id. at 713–15. In reaching its conclusion, the court 
noted that “[o]rdinarily, unpaid volunteers, whose livelihood does not depend upon their 
volunteer position, are not susceptible to the same types of economic pressures as are paid 
employees.” Id. at 712. 
 261.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 356–59 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 262.  Id. at 356. 
 263.  Id. at 358. See also supra Section IV.A. Judge Gibbons also relied on the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion in McGuiness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 170 F.3d 974 
(10th Cir. 1998). 
 264.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 357 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 
(2d Cir. 1999)). 
 265.  Id. at 358 (quoting United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 91–92 (2d 
Cir. 2004)) (citations omitted). 
 266.  Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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employment relationship.”267 Concluding, she stated that she 
would have 
. . . adopt[ed] the two-step test applied by other circuit courts: 
first, the plaintiff must show that she was hired by the putative 
employer by “establish[ing] that she received remuneration in 
some form from her work,” and, second, after the plaintiff 
establishes remuneration, the court will apply the common-law 
agency test set forth in Darden and Reid “to determine whether an 
employment relationship exists.”268 
Applying that test to the facts in Bryson, Judge Gibbons 
determined that the appropriate result was a remand to allow a jury 
to decide whether the benefits were “indirect but significant 
remuneration . . . or inconsequential incidents of an otherwise 
gratuitous relationship.”269 Despite Judge Gibbons’ dissent, the Sixth 
Circuit has adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test, and does 
not require courts to evaluate remuneration as a prerequisite to 
establishing an employment relationship.270 
The Ninth Circuit also appears not to look at remuneration as a 
threshold inquiry when determining employment status.271 In 
Fichman v. Media Ctr., the court addressed whether two groups of 
individuals were employees under the ADEA and/or the ADA after 
the plaintiff brought suit under both statutes.272 The two groups of 
individuals were (1) members of the defendant’s board of directors; 
and (2) volunteer producers who created television shows for the 
defendant’s public access channels.273 The court noted that if the 
members of either of these groups were employees, the defendant 
would be subject to both statutes’ requirements.274 If none of these 
 
 267.  Id. (relying on Davis, 126 F.3d at 115–16). 
 268.  Id. at 358–59 (quoting City of New York, 359 F.3d at 91–92). 
 269.  Id. at 359 (quoting Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 222 
(4th Cir. 1993)). 
 270.  For a more recent pronouncement from the Sixth Circuit, see Marie v. American 
Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]hus, in this circuit, remuneration is not an 
independent antecedent requirement, but rather it is a non[-]dispositive factor that should be 
assessed in conjunction with the other Darden factors to determine if a volunteer is 
an employee.”). 
 271.  Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 272.  Id. at 1158. 
 273.  Id. at 1160. 
 274.  Id. 
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individuals was an employee, the defendant would have been 
immune from ADEA and ADA liability.275 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.276 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the members of the board of 
directors.277 The court used the analysis the Supreme Court used in 
Clackamas,278 in which the Court had to decide whether physician 
shareholders of a medical group were employees under the ADA.279 
In Clackamas, the Court noted that the word “employee” was 
“intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as 
understood by common-law agency doctrine.”280 The Court listed 
factors to evaluate when making that decision, and did not conduct 
an independent inquiry regarding remuneration.281 In applying 
Clackamas and concluding that the members of the board of 
directors were not employees, the court observed: 
Under Clackamas, the district court properly concluded that the 
members of the Board of Directors were not . . . employees. [The 
defendant] does not hire or fire its directors: the Board selects its 
own members. The directors each have full-time jobs independent 
of [the defendant], and are not compensated by [the defendant]. 
Neither the travel reimbursement nor the food supplied at Board 
meetings rises to the level of compensation. The personal 
satisfaction and professional status several directors reported 
 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. at 1159. 
 277.  Id. at 1160. 
 278.  Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). As noted 
earlier, the Court has, on previous occasions, addressed the issue of an individual’s 
employment status. See supra note 7. 
 279.  Id. at 442. 
 280.  Id. at 445 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–
23 (1992)). 
 281.  Id. at 449. Those factors were the following: “Whether the organization can hire or 
fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; [w]hether and, if so, 
to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work; [w]hether the individual 
reports to someone higher in the organization; [w]hether and, if so, to what extent the 
individual is able to influence the organization; [w]hether the parties intended that the 
individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; and [w]hether the 
individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.” Id. 
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gaining from their positions with [the defendant] are typical 
benefits of volunteer work.282 
The court continued to analyze additional Clackamas factors and 
concluded that the board members were not employees.283 The only 
benefit the board members received was officers’ and directors’ 
liability insurance, and the court concluded that this was not 
sufficient to convert them into employees.284 Finally, reasoning that 
the term “employee” is interpreted uniformly under federal 
employment laws, the court concluded that its ADA analysis was also 
applicable to the ADEA claim.285 
Next, the court addressed whether the television show producers 
were employees.286 Once again, the court used Clackamas, and did 
not look at remuneration as a separate inquiry; it simply looked at 
remuneration as one factor.287 In its analysis, the court noted the 
following: “[The defendant] does not have the power to hire or fire 
producers. It does not supervise them in a traditional employer-
employee manner. The producers are not paid a salary, nor are they 
entitled to employee benefits.”288 By listing the pay issue with the 
other factors, the court was not using remuneration as a threshold 
inquiry; rather, it was looking at all factors and deciding whether the 
producers were employees under Clackamas.289 Unfortunately for 
the plaintiff, the court decided these individuals were not employees 
and that the plaintiff could not pursue his claims.290 Although the 
plaintiff lost this case, the opinion does provide some hope for 
plaintiffs because it demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit has adopted 
the minority position, which makes it slightly easier for plaintiffs to 
 
 282.  Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 283.  Id. at 1160–61. 
 284.  Id. at 1161. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. at 1161–62. 
 287.  Id. at 1162. 
 288.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Id. More recently, the Ninth Circuit relied on Fichman for the proposition that 
remuneration is not a dispositive issue. Waisgerber v. City of Los Angeles, 406 F. App’x 150 (9th 
Cir. 2010). In Waisgerber, the court cited Fichman and observed the following: “As evidenced 
by our discussion in Fichman, the fact that a person is not paid a salary does not necessarily 
foreclose the possibility that the person is an ‘employee’ for purposes of federal statutes, 
including Title VII.” Waisgerber, 406 F. App’x at 152 (relying on Fichman, 512 F.3d at 1161). 
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prove employee status, regardless of whether that determination is 
necessary to decide whether the plaintiff can sue, whether the 
defendant is covered under federal anti-discrimination statutes, or 
which statutory damage cap applies. 
As this Section of this Article has demonstrated, there is a split 
among the circuits regarding how courts decide employment status 
under federal anti-discrimination laws. Most courts require a 
threshold inquiry into remuneration, concluding that if there is 
insufficient remuneration, there is no possibility of an employment 
relationship. If, however, sufficient remuneration exists, the court 
will then look at other aspects of the relationship. The minority of 
courts look at remuneration simply as one factor when determining 
whether an employment relationship exists. Regardless of which 
approach the courts take, the end result is the same—individuals 
whom courts determine to be “true” volunteers are left unprotected 
by federal anti-discrimination statutes. 
V. HOW CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE EEOC CAN START 
PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS 
Assuming Congress, the courts, and the EEOC believe that 
federal anti-discrimination statutes should protect volunteers, there 
are several options to consider.291 The first option is for Congress to 
follow the Second and Fifth Circuits’ statements that Congress could 
amend the statutes to cover volunteers. The second option is for the 
courts to act. Specifically, the courts could do the following: (1) give 
expansive interpretations to the relevant statutory terms; (2) adopt 
the EEOC’s and the Supreme Court’s multi-factor test for 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors 
rather than continuing the current practice (majority approach) of 
requiring remuneration as a threshold inquiry before evaluating any 
other factors;292 (3) utilize previous Supreme Court precedent and 
 
 291. Although this Article argues that federal anti-discrimination statutes should apply to 
volunteers, I do understand that one policy reason for keeping these statutes inapplicable to 
volunteers is that if these statutes’ protections are expanded, entities might be less willing to 
utilize volunteers and would therefore be forced to expend valuable resources and perhaps cut 
services to the constituencies they serve. 
 292.  See supra note 7 (referencing Supreme Court cases that addressed how to 
determine employment status) and note 36 (listing factors from EEOC’s multi-factor test used 
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allow anti-discrimination statutes to protect against “evils” that 
might not have been the primary motivation behind the passage of 
those statutes; and/or (4) similar to (1) above, follow the Supreme 
Court’s and other courts’ pronouncements that anti-discrimination 
statutes should be interpreted broadly. The third option is for the 
EEOC to act. Specifically, the EEOC could change its position and 
provide volunteers with protection against discrimination; however, 
even if the EEOC does change its position, the courts will not be 
bound to follow the new position if they believe it is not persuasive. 
Regardless of which of these options (if any) occurs, individuals who 
selflessly devote their time and effort to various causes should be 
protected from discrimination. Similarly, entities that discriminate 
against volunteers should not be able to reap the rewards of these 
individuals’ work and then escape potential liability if they 
discriminate against them. 
A. Congress Can, and Should, Amend the Relevant Statutes 
When courts issue rulings with which Congress disagrees, 
Congress can amend the relevant statutes to ensure that the courts 
will interpret them consistently with Congress’s intent. This has 
happened on numerous occasions in the employment discrimination 
context; for example, (1) Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 in response to several Supreme Court opinions that weakened 
Title VII;293 and (2) Congress amended the ADA in response to 
several Supreme Court opinions that weakened that statute.294 As 
courts narrowly interpret the relevant statutory terms, Congress can 
take the opportunity to protect from discrimination those individuals 
who are willing to give up their time to help entities that benefit 
from these individuals’ commitment.295 In fact, some courts have 
 
to determine employment status); see also infra note 336 (addressing some courts’ 
interpretations of Supreme Court cases regarding this issue). 
 293.  See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Website, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/cra-1991.cfm, last visited October 28, 2015. 
 294.  See Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), Department of 
Labor Website, http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/ADAfaqs.htm (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 295.  This possibility was raised by both the Second and Fifth Circuits. See O’Connor v. 
Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1997); Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 
F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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suggested that Congress could, or perhaps should, act and protect 
these individuals under these statutes. 
For example, in O’Connor, the plaintiff was a student who had to 
complete “field work” at one of the entities approved by her 
college.296 While there, the plaintiff was sexually harassed and sued 
the state and the hospital under Titles VII and IX.297 The district 
court concluded that the plaintiff was not an “employee” and that 
the entity where she volunteered was not an “educational 
institution” under Title IX.298 After next concluding that the plaintiff 
was not an employee because of a lack of remuneration, the Second 
Circuit ruled that the plaintiff ’s Title VII claim was without merit.299 
The court was not, however, entirely enthusiastic about this result; 
specifically, the court appeared to sympathize with the plaintiff and 
suggested that Congress might want to act regarding this issue. 300 
The Second Circuit was not the only court to be sympathetic to 
volunteers who find themselves the victims of discrimination.301 For 
example, in Juino, the Fifth Circuit cited O’Connor and stated the 
following after ruling that a volunteer firefighter was not an 
employee under Title VII: “Lastly, we conclude that it is within the 
province of Congress, and not this court, to provide a remedy under 
Title VII for plaintiffs in [the plaintiff ’s] position.”302 
 
 296.  126 F.3d at 113. 
 297.  Id. at 114. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. at 116. 
 300.  See id. at 119 (“[W]e conclude by saying only that we are not unsympathetic to 
O’Connor’s situation. We recognize, for example, that from her perspective, her success at 
Marymount was dependent to some degree on successfully completing her internship with 
Rockland, and that her dependency on Rockland made her vulnerable to continued harassment 
much as an employee dependent on a regular wage can be vulnerable to ongoing misconduct. 
In a similar vein, we recognize that O’Connor was not in quite the same position to simply 
walk away from the alleged harassment as are many other volunteers. However, it is for 
Congress, if it should choose to do so, and not this court, to provide a remedy under either Title VII 
or Title IX for plaintiffs in O’Connor’s position. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district 
court.” (emphasis added)). 
 301.  See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 302.  Id. at 439 (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 119); see also Vander Boegh v. 
EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1061–62 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Demski v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 419 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005), where the court noted that under the Energy 
Reorganization Act, Congress could expand the definition of a term it believes the courts are 
interpreting too narrowly). 
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Because volunteers are not covered under federal anti-
discrimination statutes, and because most courts are making it 
difficult for individuals to prove employee status, it is time for 
Congress to listen to the Second and Fifth Circuits and step in and 
correct this problem. While eliminating discrimination against 
volunteers was not Congress’s objective in drafting these statutes, this 
is a worthy goal that warrants changes to protect people upon whose 
services many entities rely to function effectively. Also, as discussed 
later, courts often broadly interpret anti-discrimination statutes and 
extend their protections beyond the principal evils the statutes were 
meant to address.303 
B. Courts Could Use an Expansive Interpretation of the Relevant 
Statutory Definitions to Cover Volunteers, and They Could Follow 
Supreme Court Precedent That Does Not Use the Threshold 
Remuneration Test 
Although courts have rejected a broad interpretation of the term 
“individual,”304 applying a broad interpretation to that term is one 
approach courts could use to protect volunteers from discrimination. 
Specifically, Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination provides 
the following: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
 
 303.  See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 608 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that although the ADEA was intended to protect older 
workers from younger workers, the statute also protects younger workers who are within the 
class protected by the ADEA); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–
79, 82 (1998) (observing that although the impetus behind Title VII was not to prevent same-
sex sexual harassment, same-sex sexual harassment can be actionable under Title VII); 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (holding that although 
Title VII was intended to protect minorities, it also protects non-minorities). 
 304.  See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 
1998) and cases cited therein. 
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any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.305 
Clearly, Title VII’s language prohibits discrimination against 
“individuals.”306 The language does not limit its protections to 
“employees.”307 One possible reason for this is that the term 
“individual” covers job applicants and former employees.308 Also, 
Title VII’s language indicates that employers are prohibited from 
discriminating, suggesting that only employees are the intended 
beneficiaries of these statutes.309 Although some courts have 
addressed the “individuals” argument, just about all of them decided 
that the term “individuals” is limited to employees, former 
employees, and job applicants.310 
This approach, however, has not always been followed,311 and 
perhaps a pro-plaintiff court could return to the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning in Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, which, many years ago, 
gave an expansive interpretation to the word “individual.”312 In 
 
 305.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added). One possible way to address the 
issue raised in this Article is to provide protection for volunteers who are the victims of 
discrimination, but not to count volunteers when determining whether an entity has enough 
employees to satisfy the statutory definition of “employer.” This is a valid option as it protects 
volunteers because they are “individuals” and thus protected under the substantive 
prohibitions against discrimination, yet it also respects the definition of “employer” because 
that definition focuses on “employees.” 
 306.  Id. Even with a broad interpretation of the term “individual,” this would help 
volunteers only if the entities for which they “worked” employed at least fifteen employees, as 
only “employers” with a minimum number of employees are subject to federal anti-
discrimination statutes. See supra note 5. 
 307.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 308.  See supra note 4. 
 309.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). One other problem for plaintiffs is that the 
substantive prohibition against discrimination covers “compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment,” which highlights Congress’s concern regarding the employment 
relationship. Id. (emphasis added). 
 310.  See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 
1998) and numerous cases cited therein. See also Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court, 392 
F.3d 151, 157 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Title VII’s language prohibits discrimination 
against “individuals” but deciding that the statute covers only employees); Chatmon v. 
Vision Hospitality, LLC., No. 2:10-CV-485(MHT), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89242, at *10 
(M.D. Ala. July 11, 2011), adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85761 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 
2011) (same). 
 311.  See, e.g., Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 312.  Id. at 1341–42. 
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Wilson, a “private duty nurse” sued a hospital, claiming 
discrimination.313 The plaintiff appeared to work as an independent 
contractor, as his name was on a registry that matched patients with 
the nurses.314 After the defendant rejected the plaintiff when he 
reported for an assignment, the plaintiff sued.315 The court addressed 
whether the plaintiff was able to pursue a Title VII claim against the 
hospital as the plaintiff was not truly a hospital employee.316 
Although the hospital agreed that it was an “employer,” it argued 
that it was not the plaintiff’s employer.317 The hospital then argued 
that the plaintiff could not sue it.318 The court disagreed, concluding 
that Title VII allowed the plaintiff to pursue his claim.319 The court 
focused on the Act’s use of the phrase “any individual.”320 
The court also noted that the EEOC charge form did not use 
the term “employee,” but rather it used the term “person 
aggrieved.”321 This, according to the court, supported its position 
that even “non-employees” could pursue Title VII claims.322 
The hospital then tried to use Title VII’s remedies provision as 
proof that only employees could sue.323 Specifically, the hospital 
argued that the statute’s remedies would make sense only if Title VII 
 
 313.  Id. at 1339–40. 
 314.  Id. at 1339. Admittedly, this case involved the distinction between independent 
contractors and employees, not the distinction between volunteers and employees. 
 315.  Id. at 1339–40. 
 316.  Id. at 1340–42. 
 317.  Id. at 1340. 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  Id. at 1342. 
 320.  Id. at 1341 (“The Act defines ‘employee’ as ‘an individual employed by an 
employer,’ but nowhere are there words of limitation that restrict references in the Act to ‘any 
individual’ as comprehending only an employee of an employer. Nor is there any good reason 
to confine the meaning of ‘any individual’ to include only former employees and applicants for 
employment, in addition to present employees. Those words should, therefore, be given their 
ordinary meaning so long as that meaning does not conflict with the manifest policy 
of the Act.”). 
 321.  See id. The current EEOC charge form uses the terms “complainant” and 
“charging party.” See EEOC, Charge of Discrimination, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/forms/upload/form_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 322.  Wilson, 488 F.2d at 1341. (explaining the defendant’s argument that because Title 
VII’s remedies provision allows for hiring and reinstatement, it is inapplicable to volunteers, 
for whom those remedies would not be applicable). 
 323.  Id. at 1342. 
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were limited to employment relationships.324 The hospital argued 
that the remedies provision “concerns relief that only an employer 
can give to its employees.”325 The court rejected this argument, 
observing that the list of remedies was not an exhaustive list, but 
rather it was merely “illustrative.”326 
The court therefore rejected the argument that only employees 
could sue under Title VII.327 Even prior to its analysis of the 
statutory language, the court hinted that it was leaning in a pro-
plaintiff direction.328 Specifically, the court noted earlier in the 
opinion that one of Title VII’s main purposes was “to achieve 
equality of employment opportunities.”329 It also noted that another 
purpose was to “provide equal access to the job market for both men 
and women.”330 After noting that employers can exert “[c]ontrol 
over access to the job market,”331 the court stated that “it would 
appear that Congress has determined to prohibit [employers] from 
exerting any power [they] may have to foreclose, on indivious [sic] 
grounds, access by any individual to employment opportunities 
otherwise available to him.”332 The court concluded that the 
hospital’s reading of the statute would yield the anomalous result of 
condoning behavior that would interfere with the individual rights 
Congress sought to protect.333 
Although Wilson gave an expansive interpretation to Title VII, 
most courts since then have rejected Wilson and have concluded that 
“any individual” is restricted to employees, job applicants, and 
 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Id. (“While neither hiring nor reinstatement may be relevant outside the context of 
direct employment, both injunctive and back pay relief (in the sense of monetary damages for 
lost employment opportunities) may be available, in an appropriate case, against respondents 
who are neither actual nor potential direct employers of particular complainants, but who 
control access to such employment and who deny such access by reference to 
invidious criteria.”). 
 327.  Id. at 1342. 
 328.  See id. at 1340–41. 
 329.  Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)) (emphasis 
supplied by D.C. Circuit). 
 330.  Id. at 1341 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 
(5th Cir. 1971)). 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Id. 
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former employees.334 Thus, unless Congress or the Supreme Court 
instructs them to do so, lower courts will most likely not apply 
Wilson to future cases. 
Another way the courts could give a more broad interpretation 
to these anti-discrimination statutes is by utilizing the common-law 
agency test the Supreme Court used in Clackamas, Reid, and 
Darden when analyzing who qualifies as an employee.335 That test 
 
 334.  See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 
1998) and numerous cases cited therein. The court in Llampallas noted the following: 
This limitation is necessary to further Congress’ intent in enacting Title VII. “Title 
VII does not presume to obliterate all manner of inequity.” Instead, Congress 
intended to limit the scope of the Act to specific employment relationships; thus, 
the statute provides relief only against “employers” as defined under the statute. We 
can assume that Congress also meant to limit the pool of potential plaintiffs under 
Title VII; otherwise, any person could sue an “employer” under the statute 
regardless of whether she actually had an employment relationship with that 
employer. Hence, courts have almost universally held that the scope of the term 
“any individual” is limited to employees. 
Title VII’s remedial scheme also supports this interpretation; the statute authorizes 
remedies such as reinstatement, hiring, and back pay that could not make a non-
employee plaintiff whole. Moreover, in 1972, Congress extended the reach of Title 
VII to the federal workplace, amending the Act to cover “all personnel actions 
affecting employees or applicants for employment . . .” Because Congress intended, 
by this amendment, to make Title VII applicable in the federal workplace to the 
same extent that it was already applicable in the non-federal workplace . . . the 
amendment supports the interpretation of “any individual” in the original Act as 
limited to those individuals who are employees. 
Id. at 1243 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). Also, in Blankenship v. City of 
Portsmouth, 372 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (E.D. Va. 2005), the district court concluded that the 
term “individual” is limited to employees. Many other courts have stated that Title VII and 
other remedial statutes should be given a broad construction, but those courts have still 
concluded that volunteers are not “employees” under the statute. See, e.g., Scott v. City of 
Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189–91 (W.D. Okla. 2005). 
 335.  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of who is an employee 
under various federal statutes; however, in those cases, the issue did not involve the distinction 
between employees and volunteers. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 
440 (2003) (applying a multi-factor, common-law agency test focusing on control when 
deciding whether physician-shareholders in a medical practice group were “employees” under 
the ADA); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (applying a 
multi-factor, common-law agency test for determining who qualifies as an “employee” under 
ERISA); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (applying a 
common-law agency test focusing on control to determine whether an individual was an 
“employee” under the Copyright Act). Some of the courts that have adopted the threshold 
remuneration test have argued that because there was an obvious payment in all three of these 
Supreme Court cases, the Court did not have to address threshold remuneration; payment was 
unquestionably present, so the Court did not have to engage in that preliminary analysis. See 
supra cases cited in Part IV. 
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provides a list of several factors, with no one factor (including the 
issue of payment) being dispositive.336 The test focuses mostly on the 
issue of control, but it does address other issues for courts to 
evaluate.337 If the courts adopt this test, plaintiffs would be able to 
get past the threshold remuneration test, a test which defeats many 
plaintiffs’ claims.338 If the courts were to look at the non-exhaustive 
list of factors from the Supreme Court and the EEOC’s Compliance 
Manual, more plaintiffs would be considered “employees” and more 
defendants would be considered “employers.” Both of these 
outcomes would allow more “volunteers” to pursue discrimination 
claims. This, of course, does not change the courts’ current position 
that volunteers are not entitled to pursue discrimination claims; it 
does, however, allow for a broader definition of “employee” and 
“employer,” which would allow more people to seek relief under 
federal (and state) anti-discrimination statutes. 
With just about all courts rejecting the argument that all 
“individuals,” including volunteers, can sue under federal anti-
discrimination statutes,339 the more productive path plaintiffs could 
pursue is to try to convince courts to adopt the Supreme Court’s test 
for determining employment status. Although that test focuses more 
on the distinction between employees and independent contractors 
than it does on the distinction between employees and volunteers, if 
courts were to apply that test to cases involving the issue of whether 
someone is an employee rather than a volunteer, more “volunteers” 
would be able to prove employee status and therefore be protected 
from discrimination. In light of the service these individuals provide 
to various entities and to the public, they should be entitled to 
this protection. 
 
 336.  See EEOC, Comp. Man. § 2-III(A)(1) (2013), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html); see also supra notes 36, 37. 
 337.  See supra note 36. 
 338.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 339.  See Llampallas, 163 F.3d 1236 and cases cited therein. 
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C. Although Discrimination Against Volunteers Was Not the 
Principal Evil Motivating the Passage of these Statutes, the Courts 
Could Still Apply the Statutes to Volunteers, and the Courts Could Also 
Follow the Policy of Broadly Interpreting Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
When Congress passed Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, 
discrimination against volunteers was not the principal evil it sought 
to eradicate.340 The Supreme Court has, however, on occasion noted 
that anti-discrimination statutes often go beyond the principal evils 
they were meant to address; specifically, in one of the most notable 
examples of this, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,341 Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that although same-sex sexual harassment was 
not the principal evil Congress was addressing when it passed Title 
VII, the law did, in fact, protect victims of same-sex sexual 
harassment.342 Justice Scalia observed: 
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in 
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.343 
Justice Thomas echoed that sentiment when addressing the 
ADEA; specifically, in his dissenting opinion in General Dynamics 
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, Justice Thomas concluded that although the 
ADEA was intended to protect older workers, the ADEA should also 
protect younger workers, as long as they were members of the 
ADEA’s protected class.344 Justice Thomas relied on Oncale’s 
“principal evil” argument and stated: 
 
 340.  The principal reason for passing Title VII was the elimination of racial 
discrimination in employment. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 
278–80 (1976). The evil Congress sought to eradicate when passing the ADEA was 
discrimination against older individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012). The evil Congress sought 
to eradicate when passing the ADA was “discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012). 
 341.  523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 342.  Id. at 79–80. 
 343.  Id. at 79 (emphasis added). 
 344.  Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 613 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Hence, the Court apparently concludes that if Congress has in 
mind a particular, principal, or primary form of discrimination 
when it passes an antidiscrimination provision prohibiting persons 
from “discriminating because of [some personal quality],” then the 
phrase “discriminate because of [some personal quality]” only 
covers the principal or most common form of discrimination 
relating to this personal quality. 
The Court, however, has not typically interpreted 
nondiscrimination statutes in this odd manner. “[S]tatutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.”345 
Applying this “principal evil” argument here, one could certainly 
argue that even though discrimination against volunteers was not the 
principal evil Congress sought to eradicate when passing these 
statutes, volunteers should still be protected by this legislation. 
Unlike Oncale and Cline, however, where a plain reading of the 
relevant statutory language certainly could have been interpreted in 
the way Justices Scalia and Thomas argued it should have been 
interpreted, the statutory language involved with the issue of 
whether volunteers are covered under federal anti-discrimination 
statutes more likely than not favors a result where the individuals are 
not protected, as those anti-discrimination laws focus on employment 
relationships, not volunteer relationships.346 As a result, courts will be 
less likely to use the “principal evil” argument and adopt a pro-
plaintiff approach. 
In addition to the “principal evil” argument, there is another 
argument courts could use to conclude that Title VII should protect 
volunteers; specifically, since Title VII’s enactment, many courts have 
 
 345.  Id. at 608 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). See 
also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279, where the Court held that although Title VII was intended 
to protect minorities, it also protected non-minorities. 
 346.  See Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 
10 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Title VII is an employment law, available only to employees . . . seeking 
redress for the unlawful employment practices of their employers.”). See also Fantini v. Salem 
State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (“‘The employment discrimination statutes have 
broad remedial purposes and should be interpreted liberally, but that cannot trump the narrow, 
focused conclusion we draw from the structure and logic of the statutes.’”) (quoting EEOC v. 
AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
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observed that anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted 
broadly.347 For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court commented 
that Title VII should be interpreted broadly when it handed down 
its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.348 More recently, the Court 
has interpreted anti-discrimination statutes broadly and in favor of 
plaintiffs in order to further those statutes’ purposes.349 For example, 
in Crawford, the Court provided a broad interpretation of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s opposition clause.350 Also, the Court 
in Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP adopted a broad interpretation 
of Title VII and determined that Title VII prohibits third-party 
retaliation.351 Therefore, although the Court has in some instances 
taken a restrictive view of these statutes, it has routinely mentioned 
that these statutes should be interpreted broadly.  
As a result of these statements from the Court, many United 
States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts have 
followed that guidance and have given a broad interpretation to 
these statutes.352 As just noted, several United States Courts of 
Appeals have recognized that remedial statutes such as Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA should be interpreted broadly. For example, in 
Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower 
court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
Title VII claim, which was based on sex discrimination.353 In 
reaching its conclusion that the district court incorrectly granted the 
motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit referred to the text of Title 
VII and observed that “[c]ourts have consistently interpreted this 
 
 347.  As addressed in this Section of the Article, this is true in cases from the United 
States Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals, and the United States 
District Courts. 
 348.  401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
 349.  See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009) 
(providing a broad, pro-plaintiff interpretation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision); 
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (adopting a pro-plaintiff position and 
allowing third-party retaliation claims under Title VII); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (adopting a somewhat liberal definition of “adverse employment 
action” and also deciding that employers can be held liable for retaliatory conduct that occurs 
off-site). Also, the Court took a pro-plaintiff approach in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 
337 (1997), when it decided that Title VII covered former employees. 
 350.  See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276–80. 
 351.  562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
 352.  Some of these cases are addressed now. 
 353.  674 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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intentionally broad language to apply to potential, current, and past 
employees.”354 The court noted that the statute protected “any 
individual,” and that this language clearly protects 
former employees.355 
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has also 
recently emphasized that federal anti-discrimination statutes should 
be interpreted broadly.356 In reversing the district court’s granting of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a religious 
discrimination claim, the court in Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, 
LLC, noted that “Title VII is a remedial statute that we construe 
liberally in favor of employee protection.”357 
United States District Courts have also agreed that remedial 
statutes such as Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA should be 
interpreted broadly; in fact, some of these district court opinions 
involved the particular topic of this Article.358 Specifically, in EEOC v. 
Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., the court had to decide whether two 
family members who did not draw a salary were employees.359 If they 
were employees, the company would have met the fifteen-employee 
threshold to be covered under Title VII.360 In concluding that these 
individuals were employees, the court noted that “a broad 
interpretation of the term employee is necessary to effectuate the 
purposes of Title VII.”361 Thus, the court gave a broad interpretation 
to the term “employee,” and if other courts are willing to use the 
“broad interpretation” analysis when addressing the 
employee/volunteer issue, more individuals will be protected. 
 
 354.  Id. at 268 (emphasis in original). 
 355.  Id. Although the court adopted a broad interpretation of “any individual,” it was 
referring to a former employee, not a volunteer. Id. Courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have been much more receptive to the issue of whether federal anti-discrimination laws protect 
former employees than they have been to the issue of whether those statutes protect 
volunteers. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (deciding that former 
employees are protected under Title VII). 
 356.  See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 357.  Id. 
 358.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., 716 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1989); 
Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 4, 2012). 
 359.  716 F. Supp. at 1432–33. 
 360.  Id. at 1432. 
 361.  Id. at 1433. 
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Other district courts have also observed that Title VII should be 
interpreted broadly; specifically, the court in Volling relied on 
Seventh Circuit precedent and observed that courts are required to 
construe Title VII broadly and that the term “employee” should be 
given a “generous construction.”362 If more courts applied this 
approach, more volunteers would be covered, and many 
“workplaces” would be more inviting places for people to 
volunteer their time.363 
Following such an approach would encourage volunteers who 
are facing discrimination to continue providing services to the 
entities for which they volunteer. This is something Congress and 
the courts should want, but is only likely to happen by changing the 
way of analyzing the volunteer issue. 
D. The EEOC Could Change Its Position and Interpret Federal Anti-
Discrimination Statutes to Protect Volunteers 
The EEOC has not issued a regulation regarding whether these 
statutes should apply to volunteers.364 It has, however, addressed this 
issue in section 2-III(A)(1)(c) of its Compliance Manual. There, the 
EEOC is quite clear that volunteers cannot pursue these claims; 
however, the agency does provide exceptions to this general rule.365 
Specifically, according to the Manual: 
Volunteers usually are not protected “employees.” However, an 
individual may be considered an employee of a particular entity if, 
as a result of volunteer service, s/he receives benefits such as a 
pension, group life insurance, workers’ compensation, and access to 
professional certification, even if the benefits are provided by a 
third party. The benefits constitute “significant remuneration” 
 
 362.  Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *32 (relying on Smith v. Castaways 
Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2006) and on Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 
87 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 363.  See Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *32–33 (“A workplace is not 
necessarily any different for a non-compensated volunteer than it is for a 
compensated ’employee,’ and while both are generally free to quit if they don’t like the 
conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither should have to quit to avoid sexual, 
racial, or other unlawful discrimination and harassment.”). 
 364.  See supra note 21. 
 365.  See EEOC COMPL. MAN., § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (2013), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html. 
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rather than merely the “inconsequential incidents of an otherwise 
gratuitous relationship.”366 
The EEOC also has the following exception listed in its Manual: 
“A volunteer may also be covered by the EEO statutes if the 
volunteer work is required for regular employment or regularly leads 
to regular employment with the same entity. In such situations, 
discrimination by the respondent operates to deny the charging party 
an employment opportunity.”367 Although many courts agree with 
the EEOC’s positions on when “volunteers” can sue under federal 
anti-discrimination statutes, the EEOC Compliance Manual does not 
have the force of law, and the Supreme Court has determined that 
the positions the agency has articulated in the Compliance Manual 
are “entitled to respect” only to the extent that they have the 
“power to persuade.”368 As a result, even if the EEOC changes the 
position it articulated in the Compliance Manual with respect to 
whether volunteers can pursue federal anti-discrimination claims, it is 
uncertain, at best, whether courts would defer to that position. 
Even if the EEOC does not change its position on this issue, at 
the very least, courts could follow the EEOC’s multi-factor approach 
to determine employee status.369 Although this change would not 
guarantee success for all plaintiffs, it would at least give them 
stronger footing on which to stand when pursuing these 
discrimination claims. By changing its position with respect to 
volunteers and their status under federal anti-discrimination statutes, 
the EEOC can attempt to make it easier for volunteers to pursue 
their claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the time and effort volunteers devote to their endeavors, 
they are typically left without a federal remedy if they are 
discriminated against based upon membership in a protected class. 
 
 366.  Id. 
 367.  Id. 
 368.  See McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)); see also supra note 21. 
 369.  See supra notes 37 and 67 regarding a possible inconsistency between the two 
positions the EEOC has taken on this issue. 
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Because the relevant statutes focus on protecting employment 
relationships, volunteers must demonstrate that they are actually 
employees who are mislabeled as volunteers. 
Although the courts unanimously agree that volunteers are not 
covered under federal anti-discrimination statutes, the courts 
disagree regarding how to determine employment status. Most 
courts first evaluate whether the individual in question receives 
sufficient remuneration; if the individual does not receive sufficient 
remuneration, the inquiry is over, and the individual will not be 
protected. If there is sufficient remuneration, the courts then apply 
common-law agency principles to complete the analysis. Other 
courts look at remuneration simply as one factor in making 
this determination. 
To protect volunteers and to encourage volunteerism, Congress, 
the courts, and the EEOC should act. Congress could do so rather 
easily, as it has previously amended several anti-discrimination 
statutes to broaden their protections. Without Congressional action, 
the courts would have a difficult time protecting volunteers; 
however, there are ways in which the courts could try to do so. 
Courts could give broad interpretations to the relevant statutory 
terms; they could adopt the Supreme Court’s multi-factor test for 
determining employment status rather than continuing the current 
majority approach of requiring remuneration as a threshold inquiry 
before evaluating any other factors; they could utilize previous 
alternative Supreme Court precedent that allow statutes to protect 
against “evils” that might not have been the primary motivation 
behind the passage of anti-discrimination statutes; or they could 
follow the Supreme Court’s and other courts’ pronouncements that 
anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted broadly. Finally, 
although it is likely the least effective way of protecting volunteers, 
the EEOC could change its position on this issue. Even if the EEOC 
was able to make this change, however, it is questionable whether 
courts would defer to the EEOC’s new position. 
Volunteers serve a valuable role for many types of entities. As this 
Article demonstrates, many entities responsible for the health and 
safety of individuals rely on volunteers to provide essential services, 
and although these selfless individuals typically do not rely on their 
volunteer activities for their livelihood, they should not be forced to 
endure discrimination. To prevent this, Congress, the courts, and the 
EEOC should all take active roles in expanding federal anti-
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discrimination statutes to protect those individuals who have little or 
no protection against discrimination at the “workplace.” By doing 
so, more individuals would continue volunteering their time, and 
more “employers” would be required to treat those who provide 
invaluable service to them more favorably.   
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